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Abstract 
Privatization is one of the major economic phenomena in recent economic history. This paper 
summarizes empirical research on the effect of privatization on the performance of privatized 
firms and on the society. The extant evidence from privatizations in many developed and 
developing shows that privatization usually results in an increased productivity and positive 
effects on the society. The effect of privatization depends however on economic institutions in 
place, in particular on rule-of-law, competition, hard budget constraints, quality of governance 
and regulation. We pay a special attention to the cases of Russia and China and show that their 
experience is consistent with the conventional wisdom once one accounts for an appropriate 
counterfactual. 
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Why Is Privatization Research Important? 
Since 1979, many countries have embarked on the course of privatization which has changed the 
economic landscape around the world. Privatization has spread to many industries, including 
those that had never been privately owned. Privatization has transformed command economies in 
post-communist countries into decentralized ones. It has changed the political balance of power 
in many societies and revolutionized global financial markets. Yet, the intellectual debate on the 
benefits of privatization is far from over. The available research shows that the impact of 
privatization on the privatized firms and on the economy and society depends on many variables 
including political and economic institutions. There are significant complementarities between 
privatization and other reforms. It also matters how privatization is structured and who the new 
owners are. In particular, there are substantial benefits to opening up to foreign ownership.  
We summarize the extant research on privatization in this article, and also discuss two important 
cases that are often referred to as evidence against privatization: Russia and China. In Russia 
(and some other CIS countries), privatization seems to have produced few benefits for the 
privatized firms or for society, whereas China has managed to pursue a reform package that has 
not so far included the mass privatization of state-owned enterprises and yet has produced very 
impressive results. We argue that in both cases–as well as in other controversial privatization 
examples such as Latin America–the outcomes can be explained within the conventional 
framework once one accounts for an appropriate counterfactual. 
A comprehensive survey of the existing research on privatization would take over fifty pages (as 
it actually does in Megginson and Netter 2001; Djankov and Murrel 2002; and Megginson 2005) 
so we only summarize the general lessons and discuss the representative studies.  
Privatization Around the World 
While it is now hard to imagine the world without privatization, it is still a very recent 
phenomenon by historical standards. While there were important privatization programs in West 
Germany in the early 1960s, and in Chile during the 1970s, state ownership of business 
enterprise was pervasive, and growing, in the world economy until a quarter-century ago. In 
OECD countries, this was a result of (1) the Great Depression, which inspired a profound 
critique of private ownership, (2) the two World Wars, during which governments established (or 
reestablished) public ownership over “strategic” industries, and (3) widespread acceptance of 
social democrat philosophies stressing the strategic need for state control of an economy’s 
“commanding heights.” In the socialist countries, public ownership of the means of production 
was the essential piece of ideology; private ownership was limited to personal consumption 
goods and – in some countries – to small agricultural land plots. Not surprisingly, given the 
perceived success of Soviet industrialization and the important role of public ownership in the 
developed West, many developing countries also adopted state-directed development policies 
during the post-WWII era. 
By the late 1970s, however, there was growing disappointment with the dismal performance of 
the state-owned companies, as well as the growth slowdown in the socialist countries, prompted 
the first privatization attempts by Britain’s conservative Thatcher government. Since then, 
privatization has spread to more than 100 countries that collectively have privatized tens of 
thousands of firms, and have raised almost $1.5 trillion. Privatization has produced substantial 
fiscal benefits: in many countries, privatization revenues accounted for 10 percent or more of 
government budgets in some years, and saved almost as much via eliminating the need for 
further subsidies to the state owned enterprises. 
Certainly, the most dramatic privatization experiences have occurred in transition countries 
where socialist economies have been become predominantly privately owned within a decade. 
Yet, other countries have also pursued impressive privatization programs; moreover, as much of 
post-communist privatization was non-cash-based, OECD countries and other developing 
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Figure 1: Developing countries’ revenues from privatization. Source: World Bank Privatization 
Database.  
 
Since 1984, the share of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the GDP of industrialized countries 
has fallen by almost half, to less than 5 percent.  The change was even more substantial in the 
developing countries: according to Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 1999, between 1980 and 1997, 
SOEs’ activities as a percentage of GDP decreased from 11 to 5 percent in middle income 
countries, and from 15 to 3 percent in low income economies. The change in employment was 
even larger. In the middle-income countries, SOE employment has come down from a peak of 13 
to about 2 percent of total employment, while in low income countries employment in state 
enterprises has dropped from over 20 to about 9 percent (Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 1999). 
 
Figure 2: The share of SOE in GDP by region. Source: Lopez-de-Silanes 2005, Figure 1. 
The Theoretical Debate on Privatization 
The policy debate on privatization is often reduced to the following simple arguments. 
Privatization helps to raise revenues for the government. Private ownership strengthens the 
incentives for profit maximization and therefore should lead to increased productive and 
allocative efficiency. Yet private ownership may involve substantial costs: there can be market 
failures related to externalities, market power, and public goods. These market failures provide a 
rationale for public ownership. 
While the policy debate is usually focused on the trade-offs above, economists argue that the 
picture is actually much more nuanced. Privatization, particularly in post-socialist countries, 
tends to impact almost all macroeconomic and many microeconomic forces, sometimes in 
conflicting ways. 
Fiscal considerations. The argument that privatization helps to raise cash for the government is 
related to the privatization’s impact on productivity. If the public ownership is optimal, then 
government is better off keeping the firms in public ownership and receiving the stream of 
profits. If the government is cash-strapped it should issue debt (or raise taxes). The privatization 
proceeds are high only when the new private owners are more efficient (or at least expect to be 
more efficient).  Therefore the fiscal benefits of privatization are certainly related to the 
efficiency and welfare advantages of private ownership. Yet, the fiscal issues are very important 
as they provide government with incentives to undertake the privatization–to raise cash and to 
eliminate public subsidies to SOE.  
Privatization and market failures. Market failures, even when they exist, do not have to be 
corrected through public ownership. Much can be achieved through regulation, taxation, and 
private provision of public goods (through profit-maximizing firms or non-profit organizations). 
There are certainly limits to this argument. Similarly to the multitasking framework of 
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Shleifer 1998 argues that privatization may result in an excessive 
emphasis on profit maximization at the expense of other socially valuable objectives. If the latter 
are not contractible, then the multitasking theory suggests that it may be optimal to weaken the 
profit maximization incentives. For example, private prisons may be very good at cutting costs 
but do not necessarily internalize the well-being of the convicts (Hart et al. 1997). Therefore 
state ownership of prisons may be socially optimal even though they would not undertake cost-
reducing measures.  
This argument applies to all societal effects of privatization–externalities, distributional 
concerns, market power–whenever government’s regulatory capacity is limited. If, for some 
reason, government cannot ensure effective regulation of the privatized firms to limit the 
negative externalities, privatization may indeed have negative implications for social welfare. 
The regulatory failure may arise from either lack of competence or incentives within government 
bureaucracy or because of regulatory capture by the regulated firms. As shown in Guriev and 
Rachinsky 2005, privatization can create powerful interest groups that have a serious effect on 
economic policy choices. In particular, if privatization creates large private monopolies in an 
economy with poor institutions, it is very likely that competition policy will never develop. 
Faccio 2006 shows that political connections are especially important in countries with less 
mature institutions. 
On the other hand, public ownership may not resolve all the relevant issues: both in democratic 
and in non-democratic regimes politicians are often concerned with issues other than economic 
efficiency and social welfare; they may be either driven by political motives or simply corrupt. 
Privatization reduces their ability to pursue political objectives.  
Market socialism. The opponents of privatization argue that neoclassical economics’ welfare 
theorems should also work in an economy with public ownership. Instead of a Soviet-type 
economy with public ownership and planning, one can imagine a market socialism (Barone 
1908; Lange 1936) system where firms are publicly owned, but exchange occurs in competitive 
markets, and SOE managers are incentivized via performance contracts. Some adherents of 
market socialism argue this is exactly what has been successfully implemented in China.  
Critics of this idea argue that it is very hard for the government to commit not to intervene in 
markets. Under market socialism, the government is omnipotent and can directly control all the 
prices. Therefore, it is hard to protect market competition from the government monopoly, which 
would not only expropriate the consumer surplus but would also undermine efficiency. It is also 
hard for the government to commit to the strict antitrust policy that weakens the market power of 
state-owned firms. Even in an open economy which “imports” product market competition, the 
government still wields a monopoly in the labor market and in markets for nontradeables. The 
government is also unable to commit to abstain from political pursuits while designing and 
enforcing management contracts. 
Another problem of government ownership is the inability to ensure the exit of failing firms. 
Governments (or government banks) often bail out firms, private or public, in order to preserve 
employment. This problem is especially severe in the case of the public firms. It is essentially 
impossible for the state to commit to not bailing out its own firms. The resulting soft budget 
constraints further aggravate the incentives problem for state-owned enterprises.  
Yet another argument in favor of private ownership is the importance of innovation. Shleifer 
1998 argues that innovation can only prosper under private ownership. While inventors can come 
up with great ideas independently of the predominant ownership forms, further development and 
commercialization of innovative ideas is certainly more likely under private ownership.  
Policy Challenges: Speed, Sequencing and Methods  
Complementarities and Sequencing  
The debate above implies that the success of privatization depends on the quality of economic 
and political institutions. Therefore reforms assuring property rights protection, competition and 
openness, hard budget constraints, good corporate governance, low corruption, and optimal 
regulation are all complementary to privatization. 
The fundamental problem of privatization is that the need for privatization is stronger in 
countries with less competent and accountable governments, yet these are exactly the countries 
that lack mature economic and political institutions. Hence, the government that cannot run the 
publicly owned firms well is often the government that is not able to design and implement 
privatization well and to carry out the complementary reforms.   
Privatizers in such countries face a chicken-and-egg problem. On one hand, they should first 
build market institutions that would reinforce the benefits of privatization. On the other hand, it 
is not clear why the reforms introducing such institutions would find any support until there is a 
critical mass of private ownership. This problem is virtually absent in OECD countries where (a) 
such institutions are already in place; (b) the majority of voters respect private property. The 
situation is very different in developing and especially transition countries where prior to mass 
privatization, the demand for market institutions is simply absent.  
It is certainly not clear which approach is better suited for solving the chicken and egg problem. 
Some countries have tried the “Machiavellian privatization” (Biais and Perotti 2002) approach 
by selling cheap and fast in order to create a demand for institutions. Others delayed privatization 
until the institutions were in place.  In Central and Eastern Europe, both approaches were tried 
and ultimately both succeeded – probably because of the external anchor of possible EU 
accession. In the former Soviet Union, both approaches were attempted but neither seems to have 
succeeded. In some countries, both privatization and institutional changes have been delayed 
indefinitely; in others, privatization has happened but institutional change is still slow. In some 
countries, particularly Russia, privatization was deemed illegitimate by the vast majority of 
population because of the perceived corruption of the sale process. This eventually resulted in a 
policy reversal, including major renationalizations.  
Speed 
An important policy choice is the speed of privatization. On one hand, in order to maximize 
privatization revenues and find the most efficient owners, privatization should be administered 
case by case rather than en masse. However, as Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995 argue, 
privatization often has to be undertaken by a divided government. In this case, the window of 
opportunity is very narrow and the case-by-case privatization is too slow while rapid, mass 
privatization may assure the transformation’s irreversibility. The problem with mass 
privatization is that if the government fails to design the mass privatization process well, this 
may undermine the public support for further reforms and the legitimacy of the emerging private 
property rights regime. 
Another sequencing/speed issue is whether to restructure and improve performance before 
privatization—not least in order to maximize privatization revenues. Boycko, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1995 argue that if the firm can be made profitable under public ownership, it should 
probably not be privatized in the first place. And vice versa, if the firm is slated for privatization 
as the government bureaucracy is not capable of running it, why trust the bureaucracy with 
restructuring the firm? 
Methods of Privatization: Share Issues, Trade Sales, or Non-Cash Privatization 
Government can privatize firms through three major approaches: share issue privatization (SIP), 
asset sales to a single buyer (trade sales), and non-cash (or “voucher”) privatization. The choice 
between SIP and the trade sales is usually driven by size. Smaller firms are sold via private 
markets (usually auctions) to a single buyer. This resolves the issue of separation of ownership 
and control which is especially severe in countries with poor corporate governance. Larger firms 
are harder to sell in their entirety, since the lack of financial intermediation precludes buyers 
from raising sufficient funds to pay a high price for the asset (Maskin 2000). Such firms are 
usually privatized via public capital markets.  
In both SIPs and asset sales, an important decision is whether to allow foreigners to bid. For an 
economist, increasing competition among bidders (either via SIP or in trade sales) should raise 
privatization revenues and eventually attract a more efficient owner. However, foreign 
participation is often ruled out due to political/nationalistic sentiment. In many cases, the 
sentiment is promoted by the incumbent bidders, who benefit from the ban on foreign ownership 
at the expense of the domestic public. Indeed, the exclusion of the foreign bidders raises 
substantial problems, especially in the case of mass privatization. When a post-socialist 
government is about to privatize a large part of the economy, there is insufficient wealth within 
the country to assure a high price for the assets. Therefore one has to resort either to dispersed 
ownership, even for small firms, or to non-cash privatization.  The latter may result in inefficient 
insider ownership and/or low privatization revenues, leading to disappointment with reforms.  
Lessons from Privatization  
The discussion above implies that privatization’s success depends on many variables, and there 
is a large scope for empirical research to measure their relative importance.  In this section we 
summarize the results of such empirical studies. 
Methodological Issues 
Most studies focus on comparing the performance of firms under private and public ownership. 
Some run cross-section regressions on the large samples of both private and public firms 
estimating the effect of ownership controlling for other determinants of performance (see the 
seminal paper by Boardman and Vining 1989). This approach is problematic as (a) ownership is 
endogenous (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999) and (b) in a cross-section, it is very hard to 
control for all possible determinants of performance at the firm level.   
The other influential approach focuses on privatization per se rather than on ownership and 
compares pre- and post-privatization performance of privatized firms. This approach–suggested 
and first used by Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh 1994, hereinafter referred to as MNR–
allows for comparing privatized firms in different industries, countries and even time periods. 
The MNR methodology has become a tool of choice for privatization researchers as it only 
requires data on the privatized firms for three years before and three years after the event of 
privatization; such data are usually readily available.  
Yet, MNR’s major advantage of looking only at the privatized firms is also a weakness. Indeed, 
one should compare the change in performance of the privatized firms to that of the other firms, 
public or private, that did not undergo privatization during this period. This approach is more 
demanding as it requires a panel dataset that would track a large set of firms over a reasonably 
long period of time (as described in Brown, Earle, and Telegdy 2006).  
There are additional methodological problems with all the approaches. First, there are many 
questions related to the appropriate measure of performance—such as whether it is best proxied 
by stock market or accounting data. Second, there are endogeneity issues. To ensure their own 
viability and to prevent the policy reversals, governments may begin by privatizing the firms that 
are likely to benefit from privatization the most. This causes a selection bias. Another source of 
selection bias is related to the quality of data, which is usually higher in countries with more 
effective government and market institutions. As the latter are more conducive to the success of 
privatization, it is likely that there are more studies of privatization successes than failures.   
Third, studies of the firm-level impacts of privatization by definition miss the external effects of 
privatization on the economy and society at large. In particular if the privatized firm is an 
unregulated monopoly, the firm-level study is likely to find a productivity increase: the resulting 
price increase will be recorded as a TFP growth even though the social returns may actually be 
negative. There are a number of ways to go beyond the firm level. One can study the well-being 
of the privatized firm’s customers. This is doable when the privatized firm is a utility company 
serving a specific region or when there is a comprehensive privatization within an industry. 
Alternatively, if a country goes through a mass privatization program, one can compare the 
economic and social outcomes at the country level.  
Summary of Research 
Firm-level effects of privatization. 
The extant firm-level empirical research on the change in productivity and employment around 
the world is summarized in the Tables 1-4 (compiled from Megginson 2005, chapters 3 and 4, 
and Chong and Lopes-de-Silanes 2005); see also tables 2.1-2.4 in Megginson 2005. The results 
of these studies show that privatization usually results in increased productivity but also leads to 
a reduction or no change in employment. There is also a strong evidence that privatization to 
foreign investors results in higher productivity gains. Privatization brings higher benefits to the 
firms wherever the appropriate institutions are in place. One should emphasize that tens of 
studies on developed, developing and transition countries using very diverse methodologies seem 
to yield very similar results.  
Consistent with the critique of market socialism above, the evidence show that performance 
contracts, corporatization, and hard budget constraints do not  work without privatization (Table 
5, Shirley and Xu, 1998, Shirley, 1999).  
Country-level effects and complementary reforms.  
Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs 2001 study the transition experiences of 25 countries and show that 
privatization is complementary to the institutional reforms that introduce rule-of-law, hard 
budget constraints, and investor protection (see the Table 2.4 in Megginsion 2005).  If these 
institutions are not developed, privatization’s impact on the economic performance is actually 
negative.  
Restructuring prior to privatization. Does it pay to restructure the firm before privatizing? The 
evidence suggests a negative answer, in line with the basic logic of privatization: privatization 
makes sense precisely because governments are not good at restructuring firms. As shown by 
Lopes-de-Silanes 1997 and Chong and Lopes-de-Silanes 2002, who study the effect of pre-
privatization restructuring on the net privatization price received, debt absorption has no effect 
on the net price, while “investment” and “efficiency” programs actually reduce the price. Chong 
and Lopes-de-Silanes also show that even labor force retrenchment programs are counter-
productive, as they all too often lead to adverse selection in the employees being let go. 
Methods of sales. Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen 2004 study the determinants of the 
choice between asset sales and share issue privatization. They show that the choice depends on 
both the market institutions and the firm-specific factors. Larger and more profitable firms are 
more likely to be sold via public capital markets. Better protection of property rights leads to a 
higher chance of asset sales privatization.  
The existing research on share issue privatization (summarized in Megginson 2005, chapter 6) 
shows that these issues are substantially underpriced. Investors who buy the privatization share 
issues earn statistically and economically significant excess returns (about 30%!) both in short- 
and long-term. This is especially striking given that the corporate finance literature documents 
negative long-term excess returns for private-sector share offerings. The underpricing probably 
reflects the fact that privatizing governments pursue multiple goals rather than just revenue 
maximization (see Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995 and Biais and Perotti 2002).  
Welfare effects. Studies of the effects of privatization on social welfare and inequality have been 
traditionally focused on utilities divestments. These studies measure the effect of privatization on 
the access to services and generally find substantial benefits, especially for lower income groups 
(see MacKenzie and Mookherjee 2003 for four countries in Latin America; Fischer, Serra, and 
Gutierrez 2004 for Chile; Jones, Jammal and Gokgur 1998 for Cote d’Ivoire; Appiah-Kubi 2001 
for Guinea). Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2001 show that water privatization in Argentina 
has resulted not only in substantial productivity growth but also in reduction in child mortality 
(saving about 500 infant and young children lives per year). Similar results are obtained in the 
studies of telecom privatizations (see Tables 4.12 and 4.13 in Megginson 2005 for a summary of 
the results). 
Stock market development. Another important impact of privatization is the development of 
financial markets. Privatizations have contributed not only to the rise of the global capital 
markets but, more importantly, have increased capitalization and liquidity of almost all non-U.S. 
national stock markets. Boutchkova and Megginson 2000 calculate the turnover ratios (total 
value of trading over the market capitalization) for individual financial markets and regress these 
on the number of privatization deals in a given country in a particular year. Controlling for 
country’s fixed effects and first-order autocorrelation, they find that each privatization raises the 
stock market liquidity (proxied by the turnover ratio) by 2.3 percent in the next year and by 
further 1.7 percent the year after that. The relationship between privatization and stock market 
development seems to be well understood by the governments: Megginson, Nash, Netter, and 
Poulsen 2004 show that governments are more likely to privatize through share issues in the 
countries with less developed capital markets, apparently in order to foster stock market 
development.  
When Does Privatization NOT Work? 
The most thorough panel study of mass privatization (Brown, Earle, and Telegdy 2006) shows 
that privatization substantially improves productivity in Romania and Hungary (by about 20-
30%) but has no positive effect in Ukraine and even a negative effect in Russia. If the general 
lesson from privatization research is that privatization usually “works”, how should one explain 
the failure of privatization in Russia and other CIS countries? The evidence suggests that 
privatization succeeds, but only if the relevant institutional environment is in place: private 
property rights protection, rule-of-law, hard budget constraints, competition and regulation (see 
Table 5 as well as Tables 1-4). In this respect, Russia and other CIS countries did not have the 
benefit of prospective EU accession to force the pace of necessary reforms. Also, EU accession 
made privatization irreversible in Central and Eastern Europe, while in the CIS policy reversal 
was indeed an important risk (which did in fact materialize in Belarus and Russia, and almost 
materialized in Ukraine), hence a fast mass privatization was needed. The other major problem in 
the CIS arose from the decision to rule out foreign participation in privatization for ideological 
reasons. Given all the constraints, Russian and other CIS privatizers had to adopt non-cash 
privatizations.  
Research shows that non-cash privatization is inferior to trade sales and share issue privatization. 
The intuition is straightforward. First, non-cash privatization results in insider ownership, which 
implies that demand for institutional reforms develops very slowly. Since market institutions are 
not in place, secondary market trading results in ownership concentration in the hands of a few 
politically connected owners (in Faccio’s dataset, Russia comes firms in terms of political 
connections). The larger the insider’s ownership stake the more he or she is protected from 
expropriation and regulation, and the more market power the company has. Therefore it is not 
surprising in Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries the post-privatization redistribution results 
in economic domination by a few large business groups (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005).  The role 
of these so called “oligarchs” is not clear. On one hand, they improve performance of their own 
firms and provide the only counterweight to a predatory government. They also represent the 
only significant constituency for whatever pro-market institutional change might take place in 
Russia (Boone and Rodionov 2002 and Guriev and Rachinsky 2005). On the other hand, their 
dominance subverts institutions in their own favor at the expense of competition policy and entry 
of new firms (Glaeser et al., 2003, Sonin, 2003, Acemoglu, 2005). 
The other implication of non-cash mass privatization is the resulting fragility and ambiguity of 
private property rights. As the owners have paid relatively little for the assets, voters believe that 
privatization is not fair and the politicians can always find support for expropriation; this risk 
undermines incentives to invest. Moreover, the negative attitude to privatization may eventually 
result in a nationalization backlash (as observed in Russia since early 2004).  
Given all the problems with privatization in Russia, was there a better alternative? Boycko, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1995 and Nellis 1999 argue the voucher privatization was the lesser evil. 
Also, although Russian transition is taking longer than in CEE, it is still happening while in 
Belarus and a few other CIS countries the reforms are delayed indefinitely. It is also important to 
put the Russian experience in perspective. Grosfeld and Hashi 2003 show that even though 
Czech Republic and Poland have pursued very different privatization policies, the ultimate 
ownership structures are actually quite similar and are driven by the same factors. This is also 
consistent with the studies in Table 4: privatization works in Russia as well whenever it results in 
concentrated ownership (in particular, foreign ownership). By design, the Russian voucher 
privatization program did not generate such ownership structure right away but the post-
privatization reallocation should eventually produce an efficient ownership structure. Because of 
underdeveloped financial markets and legal system it has taken much longer than expected but 
the recent comprehensive study of ownership structure in Russian industry (Guriev and 
Rachinsky 2003) shows that this pattern is finally emerging. 
The “Great Outlier”: China 
Another case study often used by the opponents of privatization is the transition experience of 
China. Allegedly, China is growing very fast without mass privatization, or even due to the 
decision not to privatize. However, the existing evidence suggests that privatization works in 
China as well (see Table 7). Foreign ownership and foreign listing (in particular, listing in Hong-
Kong) also positively affect performance.  
It is also not true that China has not privatized, although initially the government decided to try 
to improve SOE performance without privatization. As these hopes faded, China began 
privatizing smaller SOEs or leasing them to managers in an exchange of a fixed share of the 
resulting profit (Kikeri and Kolo 2005). This arrangement can be likened to partial privatization. 
Much privatization has also occurred via foreign direct investment into China. As a result, 
employment at Chinese state-owned industrial enterprises fell by half during 1990s.  
China has also undertaken case-by-case privatizations of minority blocks for a few hundred large 
SOEs. According to the World Bank Privatization Database, there were about 200 large 
privatization deals between 1991 and 2003 that yielded revenues of more than 18 billion dollars–
about as much as the entire Russian privatization. However, partial privatization did not result in 
substantial efficiency improvements; one reason was the prevalence of soft budget constraints 
resulting from state banks making non-performing loans to SOEs. While further privatization is 
certainly needed, the Chinese government is delaying full privatization of all SOEs out of fear of 
high unemployment and the attendant negative political implications.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications.  
There is now a growing body of research on all aspects of privatization that uses detailed datasets 
and up-to-date methodology. This research provides solid evidence that privatization “generally” 
works, both for the firms that are privatized and for privatizing economies as a whole. While 
privatization usually results both in increased productivity and reduced employment in privatized 
firms, fears of negative overall effects at the economy level are not justified. 
An important caveat here is that the benefits of privatizations depend on market institutions 
being in place. The countries that manage to ensure property rights protection and the rule-of-
law, impose hard budget constraints, increase competition, and improve corporate governance 
reap the largest benefits. If appropriate institutions are not in place, privatization often fails to 
improve performance at the firm level and for the economy as a whole. 
Emprical research provides a strong case for openness in privatization. Virtually all studies point 
to a positive role of foreign investors. Firms privatized to foreign owners exhibit the highest 
productivity increases. Moreover, as foreign owners usually buy the assets in a more competitive 
bidding process, they are likely to pay a high price for the privatized assets—and the threat of 
competition from foreign bidders also tends to raise the bids of domestic investors. Receiving a 
high net privatization price is important, not only for fiscal reasons, but also for the political 
legitimacy of emerging private property rights and the sustainability of reforms. 
Once translated into policymakers’ language, the lessons from privatization research are quite 
straightforward, as summarized below.  
- Privatization can deliver substantial benefits. In some cases productivity doubles; in other 
cases it increases by single percentage points. The “weighted average” productivity 
increase is probably around 20 percent.  
- Privatization is usually accompanied by either no change or a reduction in employment. 
Privatizers should be prepared to handle the increased unemployment, and experience 
suggests tht most privatizing countries manage this problem reasonably well. 
- Privatization usually produces welfare gains beyond the increased productivity at the firm 
level.  
- Restructuring enterprises prior to privatization is unlikely to work.  
- Mass privatization is usually inferior to the case by case approach. Non-cash privatization 
is generally worse than trade sales and share issue privatization. The choice between 
share issue privatizations and trade sales is driven by several factors-firm size, the need to 
develop national stock markets, and the trade-off between better governance under 
concentrated ownership versus the difficulty of finding a single buyer for a large 
company.  
- Policy trade-offs are resolved most effectively when privatization is transparent and open 
to foreign investors. However, insiders and domestic investors always lobby against 
allowing foreign participation and often stir up nationalistic sentiment. Precluding foreign 
ownership always results in lower privatization prices and lower post-privatization 
efficiency.   
- Share issue privatization brings an important side benefit of contributing to the 
development of the national stock market.  
- Privatization works well wherever there are good institutions. China and Russia are not 
outliers. China’s growth has come from private sector development, even as many SOEs 
are still destroying value. Russia lacked good institutions yet the demand for institutions 
has started to emerge. While this may be happening more slowly than expected–due to 
macroeconomic instability, or inequality and illegitimacy of property rights–it is not clear 
whether there was a better alternative, since openness to foreigners was probably 
politically unacceptable.  
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ie
nc
y,
 
o
u
tp
u
t a
n
d 
le
v
er
ag
e.
 
M
ac
qu
ie
ira
 a
nd
 
Zu
rit
a 
(19
96
)  
Co
m
pa
re
 p
re
- v
er
su
s 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 2
2 
Ch
ile
an
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fr
o
m
 
19
84
 to
 
19
89
.
 
U
se
 M
eg
gi
n
so
n
,
 
N
as
h 
an
d 
v
an
 
R
an
de
n
bo
rg
h 
(M
NR
) m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
to
 
pe
rfo
rm
 
an
al
ys
is 
fir
st
 
w
ith
o
u
t a
dju
st
in
g 
fo
r 
o
v
er
al
l m
ar
ke
t m
o
v
em
en
ts
 (a
s 
in
 
M
N
R
), t
he
n
 
w
ith
 
an
 
ad
jus
tm
en
t f
o
r 
co
n
te
m
po
ra
ne
o
u
s 
ch
an
ge
s.
 
U
na
dju
st
ed
 re
su
lts
 
v
irt
ua
lly
 
id
en
tic
al
 to
 M
N
R:
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
o
u
tp
u
t, 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
,
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t, 
in
v
es
tm
en
t, 
an
d 
di
v
id
en
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
.
 
A
fte
r 
ad
jus
tin
g 
fo
r 
m
ar
ke
t m
o
v
em
en
ts
, 
ho
w
ev
er
,
 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
o
u
tp
u
t, 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t, 
an
d 
liq
u
id
ity
 
ar
e 
n
o
 
lo
n
ge
r 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t, 
an
d 
le
ve
ra
ge
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
ly
.
 
V
er
br
u
gg
e,
 
M
eg
gi
n
so
n
 a
n
d 
O
w
en
s 
(19
99
) 
St
u
dy
 
o
ffe
rin
g 
te
rm
s 
an
d 
sh
ar
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 re
su
lts
 
fo
r 
65
 b
an
ks
 
fu
lly
 
o
r 
pa
rti
al
ly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fr
o
m
 
19
81
 to
 
19
96
.
 
Th
en
 
co
m
pa
re
 p
re
 
an
d 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 c
ha
n
ge
s 
fo
r 
32
 b
an
ks
 
in
 
O
EC
D
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d 
5 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pi
n
g 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 
D
o
cu
m
en
t m
o
de
ra
te
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 
in
 
O
EC
D
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
  
R
at
io
s 
pr
o
x
yi
n
g 
fo
r 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
,
 
fe
e 
in
co
m
e 
(no
n
-
in
te
re
st
 
in
co
m
e 
as
 
fra
ct
io
n
 
o
f t
o
ta
l),
 an
d 
ca
pi
ta
l a
de
qu
ac
y 
in
cr
ea
se
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
; l
ev
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
 
de
cl
in
es
 s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
.
 
D
oc
u
m
en
t l
ar
ge
, 
o
n
go
in
g 
st
at
e 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
,
 
an
d 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
po
sit
iv
e 
in
iti
al
 re
tu
rn
s 
to
 
IP
O
 in
ve
st
or
s.
 
 
B
o
ar
dm
an
,
 
La
u
rin
 
an
d 
V
in
in
g 
(20
00
) 
Co
m
pa
re
 3
-y
ea
r 
av
er
ag
e 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 r
at
io
s 
to
 
th
e 
5-
ye
ar
 
pr
e-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
v
al
ue
s 
fo
r 
9 
Ca
n
ad
ia
n
 
fir
m
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fr
o
m
 
19
88
 to
 
19
95
.
 
A
lso
 
co
m
pu
te
 lo
n
g-
ru
n
 (u
p 
to
 
5 
ye
ar
s) 
st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
s 
fo
r 
di
v
es
te
d 
fir
m
s.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
,
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 r
et
ur
n
 
o
n
 
sa
le
s 
o
r 
as
se
ts
, m
o
re
 
th
an
 
do
u
bl
es
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
w
hi
le
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
an
d 
sa
le
s a
lso
 
in
cr
ea
se
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
(th
o
u
gh
 
le
ss
 
dr
as
tic
al
ly
). L
ev
er
ag
e 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t d
ec
lin
e 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
,
 
w
hi
le
 c
ap
ita
l s
pe
n
di
n
g 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
fir
m
s 
al
so
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
o
u
t-
pe
rfo
rm
 
Ca
n
ad
ia
n
 
st
o
ck
 
m
ar
ke
t o
v
er
 a
ll 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
ho
ld
in
g 
pe
rio
ds
.
 
O
m
ra
n
 
(20
01
) 
St
u
di
es
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 c
ha
n
ge
s 
fo
r 
69
 E
gy
pt
ia
n
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
19
94
 a
nd
 1
99
8.
 O
f t
he
se
, 
33
 w
er
e 
m
ajo
rit
y 
sa
le
s 
(>
50
%
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
), 1
8 w
er
e 
pa
rti
al
 
sa
le
s,
 
12
 w
er
e 
so
ld
 
to
 
em
pl
o
ye
e 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
in
g 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
s 
(E
SA
s),
 
an
d 
6 
w
er
e 
so
ld
 to
 a
nc
ho
r 
in
ve
st
or
s.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
,
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
,
 
ca
pi
ta
l s
pe
n
di
n
g,
 
di
v
id
en
ds
 a
n
d 
liq
u
id
ity
 
in
cr
ea
se
 s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
w
hi
le
 
le
v
er
ag
e,
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t a
n
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
ris
k 
(m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 
th
e 
in
v
er
se
 o
f t
im
es
 
in
te
re
st
 
ea
rn
ed
) d
ec
lin
e 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
.
 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
ch
an
ge
s 
pe
rv
as
iv
e 
ac
ro
ss
 
su
bg
ro
up
s, 
bu
t s
o
m
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 th
at
 fu
ll 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
w
o
rk
s 
be
tte
r 
th
an
 
pa
rt
ia
l, 
an
d 
th
at
 s
al
es
 to
 
ES
A
s w
o
rk
 
be
tte
r 
th
an
 
o
th
er
s.
 
 
 O
m
ra
n
 
(20
02
) 
Pe
rfo
rm
 
sim
ila
r 
st
u
dy
 
to
 
O
m
ra
n
 
(20
01
), b
ut
 
al
so
 
co
m
pa
re
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
to
 
a 
m
at
ch
ed
 
se
t o
f 5
4 
fir
m
s 
th
at
 re
m
ai
ne
d 
sta
te
 o
w
n
ed
. 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
SO
Es
’ p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
lso
 
im
pr
ov
es
 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
du
rin
g 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pe
rio
d,
 a
nd
 th
at
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
di
d 
no
t p
er
fo
rm
 
an
y 
be
tte
r t
ha
n
 
SO
Es
.
 
 
O
kt
en
 
an
d 
A
rin
 
(20
01
) 
Te
st
 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
o
n
 
fir
m
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
an
d 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
ch
o
ic
e 
u
sin
g 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
se
t o
f 2
3 
Tu
rk
ish
 
ce
m
en
t f
irm
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
19
89
 a
nd
 1
99
8.
 E
m
pl
o
y 
M
N
R
 te
st
s 
fir
st
,
 
th
en
 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
to
 
ex
pl
o
re
 d
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
o
f p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 c
ha
n
ge
s.
 
D
o
cu
m
en
t t
ha
t p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
,
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 
u
til
iz
at
io
n
,
 
o
u
tp
ut
 
an
d 
in
v
es
tm
en
t s
ig
n
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
in
cr
ea
se
 a
fte
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
w
hi
le
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t, 
pe
r u
n
it 
co
st
s 
an
d 
pr
ic
es
 
de
cl
in
e 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
.
 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
.
 
Pa
n
el
 re
gr
es
sio
n
 
sh
o
w
s 
o
u
tp
ut
,
 
la
bo
r 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
,
 
ca
pi
ta
l a
n
d 
ca
pi
ta
l t
o 
la
bo
r 
ra
tio
 
in
cr
ea
se
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
,
 
w
hi
le
 e
m
pl
o
ym
en
t f
al
ls.
 P
er
 
u
n
it 
co
st
s 
an
d 
pr
ic
es
 a
lso
 
fa
ll.
 P
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
cl
ea
rly
 
in
du
ce
s 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
 
sh
ift
.  
Su
n
 a
n
d 
To
n
g 
(20
02
) 
Co
m
pa
re
 p
re
 v
s 
po
st
-p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
n
d 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f a
 s
am
pl
e 
o
f 2
4 
M
al
ay
sia
n
 
fir
m
s 
di
v
es
te
d 
vi
a 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
e 
o
ffe
rin
g 
by
 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 
19
97
. E
m
pl
o
y 
M
N
R
 
te
st
s 
fir
st
,
 
th
en
 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
to
 
fu
rt
he
r 
ex
am
in
e 
so
u
rc
es
 
o
f p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
ch
an
ge
s.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s 
in
cr
ea
se
 th
ei
r a
bs
o
lu
te
 le
v
el
 o
f 
pr
o
fit
s t
hr
ee
-
fo
ld
,
 
m
o
re
 
th
an
 
do
u
bl
e 
re
al
 sa
le
s, 
an
d 
al
so
 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
in
cr
ea
se
 d
iv
id
en
ds
 
an
d 
re
du
ce
 le
ve
ra
ge
.
 
R
es
u
lts
 
ar
e 
ro
bu
st
 
ac
ro
ss
 
v
ar
io
u
s 
su
b-
sa
m
pl
es
.
 
St
o
ck
s 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
ea
rn
 
n
o
rm
al
 
re
tu
rn
s 
(in
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 d
iff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 
m
ar
ke
t i
n
de
x
). 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
an
al
ys
is 
sh
o
w
s 
th
at
 
in
sti
tu
tio
n
al
 in
v
es
to
rs
 a
n
d 
di
re
ct
o
rs
 
ha
v
e 
po
sit
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
an
d 
th
at
 
o
pt
io
n
 
sc
he
m
es
, 
ra
th
er
 
th
an
 
di
re
ct
 r
em
u
n
er
at
io
n
,
 
gi
v
e 
be
tte
r 
in
ce
n
tiv
es
 
to
 
m
an
ag
er
s.
 
Su
n
 a
n
d 
To
n
g 
(20
02
) 
Te
st
 w
he
th
er
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
im
pr
o
v
es
 fi
n
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 3
1 
Si
n
ga
po
re
an
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
di
v
es
te
d 
th
ro
u
gh
 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
e 
o
ffe
rin
g 
be
tw
ee
n
 
19
75
 an
d 
19
98
. E
m
pl
o
y 
M
N
R
 
te
st
s 
fir
st
,
 
th
en
 
pa
n
el
 d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
to
 fu
rt
he
r 
ex
am
in
e 
so
u
rc
es
 
o
f 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 c
ha
n
ge
s.
 
Fi
nd
 
n
o
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
 c
ha
n
ge
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
in
 
an
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e 
ex
ce
pt
 
o
u
tp
ut
 
(si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
) u
sin
g 
M
N
R
 
m
et
ho
ds
.
 
Th
en
 
u
se
 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
an
al
ys
is 
to
 
sh
o
w
 
th
at
 
o
u
tp
u
t a
n
d 
le
v
er
ag
e 
im
pr
ov
e 
bu
t 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
de
te
rio
ra
te
s a
fte
r p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
 
Co
n
cl
u
de
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is 
lit
tle
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 im
pr
o
v
em
en
t a
fte
r 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
ch
an
ge
 
be
ca
u
se
 
Si
n
ga
po
re
an
 
SO
Es
 
w
er
e 
u
n
u
su
al
ly
 
w
el
l m
an
ag
ed
 
be
fo
re
 
di
v
es
tm
en
t. 
 
 
 Ta
bl
e 
2.
 
Su
m
m
a
ry
 
o
f E
m
pi
ri
ca
l S
tu
di
es
 o
f P
ri
va
tiz
at
io
n
: 
D
ev
el
op
ed
 C
ou
n
tr
ie
s 
 
St
u
dy
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
,
 
st
u
dy
 
pe
rio
d,
 a
nd
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
o
f e
m
pi
ric
al
 
fin
di
n
gs
 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
sio
n
s 
G
al
al
, 
Jo
ne
s,
 
Ta
n
do
n,
 
an
d 
V
o
ge
lsa
n
g 
(19
94
) 
Co
m
pa
re
 a
ct
u
al
 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 1
2 
la
rg
e 
fir
m
s 
(m
o
st
ly
 
ai
rli
n
es
 a
n
d 
re
gu
la
te
d 
u
til
iti
es
) i
n
 
B
rit
ai
n,
 
Ch
ile
, M
al
ay
sia
, a
nd
 
M
ex
ic
o
 
to
 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f t
he
se
 fi
rm
s 
ha
d 
th
ey
 
re
m
ai
ne
d 
SO
Es
.
 
 
D
oc
um
en
t n
et
 w
el
fa
re
 g
ai
n
s 
in
 
11
 o
f t
he
 1
2 
ca
se
s 
th
at
 e
qu
al
, o
n
 
av
er
ag
e,
 2
6%
 o
f t
he
 
fir
m
s’
 
pr
e-
di
ve
st
itu
re
 s
al
es
.
 
Fi
n
d 
n
o
 
ca
se
 w
he
re
 w
o
rk
er
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
w
o
rs
e 
o
ff,
 
an
d 
3 
w
he
re
 w
o
rk
er
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
be
tte
r o
ff.
 
 
 
G
re
en
 
an
d 
V
o
ge
lsa
n
g 
(19
94
) 
Pr
o
v
id
e 
a 
hi
st
o
ric
al
 o
ve
rv
ie
w
 
o
f B
A
’
s 
ev
o
lu
tio
n 
as
 
a 
st
at
e 
o
w
n
ed
 e
nt
er
pr
ise
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
its
 
fir
st
 
ye
ar
s 
as
 
a 
fu
lly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 c
om
pa
n
y.
 
A
lso
 
an
al
yz
e 
ho
w
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
ev
o
lv
es
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
tim
e 
be
fo
re
 
an
d 
af
te
r c
om
pa
n
y’
s 
sa
le
.  
Th
ey
 
sh
o
w
 
th
at
 
B
A
 
su
ffe
re
d 
se
ve
re
ly
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
ai
rli
n
e 
de
pr
es
sio
n
 
o
f t
he
 e
ar
ly
 
19
80
s, 
bu
t t
ha
t t
he
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l c
ha
n
ge
s a
n
d 
re
str
u
ct
u
rin
g 
th
at
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t t
ea
m
 
ex
ec
u
te
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
m
id
 1
98
0s
 
pa
ve
s 
th
e 
w
ay
 
fo
r 
th
e 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 
sa
le
 
o
f t
he
 g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t’
s 
10
0 
pe
rc
en
t o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 in
 
19
87
. 
M
ar
tin
 
&
 
Pa
rk
er
 
(19
95
) 
U
sin
g 
tw
o
 m
ea
su
re
s 
(R
O
R
 
o
n
 
ca
pi
ta
l e
m
pl
oy
ed
 a
nd
 
an
n
u
al
 
gr
o
w
th
 
in
 
v
al
u
e-
ad
de
d 
pe
r e
m
pl
o
ye
e-
ho
u
r),
 
ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
11
 
B
rit
ish
 
fir
m
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
du
rin
g 
19
81
-8
8 
im
pr
ov
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
af
te
r 
di
v
es
tm
en
t. 
A
lso
 
at
te
m
pt
 to
 c
on
tr
o
l f
o
r 
bu
sin
es
s 
cy
cl
e 
ef
fe
ct
s.
 
M
ix
ed
 
re
su
lts
. 
O
u
tr
ig
ht
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 a
fte
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
fo
u
n
d 
in
 
le
ss
 
th
an
 
ha
lf 
o
f f
irm
-
m
ea
su
re
s 
st
u
di
ed
. S
ev
er
al
 im
pr
ov
e 
pr
io
r t
o 
di
ve
st
itu
re
, 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
an
 
in
iti
al
 “
sh
ak
e-
o
u
t”
 
ef
fe
ct
 u
po
n 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t. 
Pr
ic
e 
an
d 
W
ey
m
an
-
Jo
ne
s 
(19
96
) 
M
ea
su
re
 th
e 
te
ch
ni
ca
l e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
o
f t
he
 U
.K
. n
at
u
ra
l 
ga
s 
in
du
str
y 
be
fo
re
 a
n
d 
af
te
r 
its
 
19
86
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 re
gu
la
to
ry
 
ch
an
ge
s 
u
sin
g 
M
al
m
qu
ist
 in
di
ce
s 
an
d 
no
n
-p
ar
am
et
ric
 
fro
n
tie
r 
an
al
ys
is.
 
 
 
Sh
o
w
 
th
at
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
’
s 
ra
te
 o
f p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
—
th
o
u
gh
 
n
o
t a
s 
m
u
ch
 
as
 
it 
co
u
ld
 h
av
e 
if 
th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 
ha
d 
be
en
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
re
d 
an
d 
su
bje
ct
ed
 to
 d
ire
ct
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n
 
an
d 
m
o
re
 
ap
pr
o
pr
ia
te
 re
gu
la
tio
n
.
 
N
ew
be
rr
y 
an
d 
Po
lli
tt 
(19
97
) 
Pe
rfo
rm
 
a 
co
st
-
be
n
ef
it 
an
al
ys
is 
o
f t
he
 1
99
0 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 C
en
tr
al
 
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
 
G
en
er
at
in
g 
B
o
ar
d 
(C
EG
B)
.
 
Co
m
pa
re
 th
e 
ac
tu
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
to
 a
 c
ou
n
te
r-
fa
ct
u
al
 a
ss
u
m
in
g 
CE
G
B 
ha
d 
re
m
ai
n
ed
 st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
. 
Th
e 
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g/
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 o
f C
EG
B 
w
as
 
“
w
o
rt
h 
it,
” 
in
 
th
at
 th
er
e 
is 
a 
pe
rm
an
en
t 
co
st
 
re
du
ct
io
n 
o
f 5
 p
er
ce
nt
 p
er
 y
ea
r.
 P
ro
du
ce
rs
 
an
d 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s c
ap
tu
re
 a
ll 
th
is 
be
n
ef
it 
an
d 
m
o
re
.
 
Co
n
su
m
er
s 
an
d 
th
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t l
os
e.
 A
lso
 
sh
o
w
 
th
at
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
fu
el
 
pu
rc
ha
se
s 
in
v
o
lv
e 
u
n
n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
hi
gh
 
co
st
s 
an
d 
w
ea
lth
 
flo
w
s 
o
u
t o
f t
he
 c
o
u
n
tr
y.
 
La
u
rin
 
an
d 
B
o
ze
c 
(20
00
) 
Co
m
pa
re
s 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
an
d 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
o
f t
w
o
 
la
rg
e 
Ca
n
ad
ia
n
 
ra
il 
ca
rr
ie
rs
,
 
be
fo
re
 a
n
d 
af
te
r 
th
e 
19
95
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
o
f C
an
ad
ia
n 
N
at
io
n
al
 (C
N
). C
o
m
pa
re
s 
ac
co
u
n
tin
g 
ra
tio
s f
o
r 
en
tir
e 
17
-y
ea
r 
pe
rio
d 
19
81
-1
99
7 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
re
e 
su
b-
pe
rio
ds
: 
th
e 
fu
lly
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 e
ra
 
(19
81
-9
1),
 th
e 
pr
e-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pe
rio
d 
(19
92
-9
5),
 
an
d 
To
ta
l f
ac
to
r 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
o
f C
N
 
m
u
ch
 
lo
w
er
 th
an
 
th
at
 
o
f p
riv
at
el
y 
o
w
n
ed
 C
an
ad
ia
n
 
Pa
ci
fic
 (C
P)
 du
rin
g 
19
81
-9
1 
pe
rio
d,
 b
ut
 
be
co
m
es
 
jus
t a
s 
ef
fic
ie
n
t d
ur
in
g 
pr
e-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
(19
92
-95
) p
eri
o
d,
 
th
en
 
ex
ce
ed
s i
t a
fte
r 1
99
5.
 C
N
 
st
o
ck
 
pr
ic
e 
ou
t-
pe
rfo
rm
s 
CP
,
 
th
e 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
 
in
du
st
ry
,
 
an
d 
th
e 
Ca
n
ad
ia
n
 
m
ar
ke
t a
fte
r 
19
95
. B
o
th
 
fir
m
s 
sh
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s 
af
te
r 
19
92
, b
ut
 
CN
’
s 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t d
ec
lin
es
 
by
 
m
o
re
 (3
4%
 
v
s 
18
%
) 
as
 
av
er
ag
e 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
al
m
o
st
 
do
ub
le
s (
97
% 
inc
re
as
e).
 C
N
’
s 
ca
pi
ta
l s
pe
n
di
ng
 
 th
e 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
er
a.
 A
ls
o
 
ex
am
in
es
 
st
o
ck
 
re
tu
rn
s 
fro
m
 
19
95
-9
8.
 C
re
at
es
 
a 
six
-fi
rm
 
co
m
pa
ris
o
n
 
gr
o
u
p 
of
 
Ca
n
ad
ia
n
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
s,
 
an
d 
co
m
pu
te
s 
ac
co
u
n
tin
g 
ra
tio
s 
an
d 
st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
s 
fo
r 
th
es
e 
fir
m
s 
as
 w
el
l. 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
,
 
th
o
u
gh
 C
P 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
m
o
re
. 
Si
x
-fi
rm
 
Ca
n
ad
ia
n
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
co
m
pa
ris
o
n
 
gr
o
u
p 
al
so
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t s
pe
n
di
n
g 
an
d 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
,
 
an
d 
a 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t d
ec
lin
e 
in
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t. 
V
ill
al
on
ga
 
(20
00
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
o
n
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
fo
r 
24
 S
pa
n
ish
 
fir
m
s 
fu
lly
 
di
v
es
te
d 
be
tw
ee
n
 
19
85
 an
d 
19
93
. T
es
ts
 
fo
r 
se
pa
ra
te
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 c
ha
n
ge
,
 
o
n
ce
 o
th
er
 
po
lit
ic
al
 a
nd
 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 fa
ct
or
s 
an
d 
tim
e 
pe
rio
d 
(st
at
e 
of
 
th
e 
bu
sin
es
s 
cy
cl
e) 
eff
ec
ts
 
ac
co
u
n
te
d 
fo
r.
 
Fi
nd
 
in
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t c
ha
n
ge
s 
in
 
le
v
el
 a
nd
 
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
 o
f e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t p
o
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 fo
u
n
d 
fo
r 
bu
sin
es
s 
cy
cl
e 
su
gg
es
ts
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t s
o
ld
 
fir
m
s 
du
rin
g 
re
ce
ss
io
n
s.
 C
ap
ita
l i
n
te
n
sit
y,
 
fo
re
ig
n
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
an
d 
siz
e 
al
so
 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
se
em
s 
to
 d
ec
re
as
e 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
fo
r 
5 
an
d 
6 
ye
ar
s 
af
te
r d
iv
es
tit
u
re
, 
bu
t i
n
cr
ea
se
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
7 
an
d 
8 
ye
ar
s 
af
te
r 
an
d 
4 
an
d 
3 
ye
ar
s 
be
fo
re
, 
su
gg
es
tin
g 
im
po
rta
n
ce
 
o
f t
im
e 
ef
fe
ct
s.
 
Fl
or
io
 
(20
01
) 
Pr
es
en
ts
 
an
 
an
al
ys
is 
o
f t
he
 w
el
fa
re
 im
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
 U
K
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pr
og
ra
m
 
19
79
-1
99
7.
 C
o
n
sid
er
s 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
o
n
 
fiv
e 
ty
pe
s o
f a
ge
n
ts
: 
fir
m
s,
 
em
pl
o
ye
es
,
 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s, 
co
n
su
m
er
s 
an
d 
ta
x
pa
ye
rs
.
 
Co
n
cl
u
de
s t
ha
t p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
ha
s m
o
de
st 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
n
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
o
f p
ro
du
ct
io
n
 
an
d 
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
,
 
bu
t h
as
 
im
po
rta
n
t e
ffe
ct
s 
o
n
 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
 
o
f i
n
co
m
e 
an
d 
w
ea
lth
.
 
A
ck
n
o
w
le
dg
es
 fi
sc
al
 
be
n
ef
its
, l
ow
er
 
pr
ic
es
 in
 
m
o
st
 a
re
as
, 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
,
 
bu
t 
as
se
rt
s 
th
es
e 
w
o
u
ld
 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 
u
n
de
r 
co
n
tin
u
ed
 
st
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
(du
e 
to
 
ex
tr
ap
ol
at
io
n 
o
f e
x
ist
in
g 
tr
en
ds
). C
al
cu
la
te
 th
at
, a
t b
es
t, 
th
e 
N
PV
 o
f t
he
 w
el
fa
re
 c
ha
n
ge
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
B
rit
ish
 
co
n
su
m
er
 is
 
le
ss
 
th
an
 
£1
,
00
0,
 a
nd
 w
o
u
ld
 b
e 
lo
w
er
 if
 
di
str
ib
ut
io
na
l 
iss
u
es
 
ac
co
u
n
te
d 
fo
r.
 
D
um
o
n
tie
r 
an
d 
La
u
rin
 
(20
02
) 
In
v
es
tig
at
e 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
th
at
 is
 
cr
ea
te
d 
or
 lo
st 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
st
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
pe
rio
d 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 fi
rm
 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 
du
rin
g 
19
82
 a
nd
 th
en
 
re
-p
riv
at
iz
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
19
86
 a
nd
 
19
95
. T
he
n
 
te
st
s 
w
he
th
er
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
im
pr
ov
es
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
v
er
 th
at
 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
po
st-
19
82
 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 p
er
io
d.
 4
6 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
(39
 ba
nk
s 
an
d 
fiv
e 
in
du
st
ria
l f
irm
s) 
w
er
e 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 
an
d 
th
en
 
re
-
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
.
 
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t c
re
at
ed
 v
al
ue
 in
 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s,
 
bu
t s
ta
te
 a
nd
 ta
x
pa
ye
rs
 
di
d 
n
o
t b
en
ef
it 
be
ca
us
e 
o
f p
re
m
iu
m
 
pa
id
 to
 sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s u
po
n 
n
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n
 
(20
%)
 an
d 
u
n
de
rp
ric
in
g 
o
f I
PO
 
at
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
an
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s i
m
pr
ov
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
n
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n
 
ph
as
e,
 th
en
 
im
pr
o
v
ed
 e
ve
n
 
m
o
re
 a
fte
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Pr
o
fit
s a
n
d 
sa
le
s i
nc
re
as
ed
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
w
hi
le
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
im
pr
o
v
ed
 
o
v
er
 a
ll 
th
re
e 
pe
rio
ds
.
 
Em
pl
o
ym
en
t f
el
l d
ur
in
g 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 p
er
io
d,
 b
ut
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
(du
e 
to
 
hi
gh
er
 
sa
le
s) 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Ca
pi
ta
l s
pe
n
di
n
g 
hi
gh
es
t d
u
rin
g 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 
pe
rio
d,
 
du
e 
to
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t s
u
bs
id
ie
s.
 
Le
v
er
ag
e 
de
cl
in
ed
 
du
rin
g 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 
pe
rio
d,
 
bu
t i
nc
re
as
ed
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
D
iv
id
en
ds
 d
ec
lin
e 
du
rin
g 
n
at
io
n
al
iz
ed
 
pe
rio
d,
 
bu
t 
in
cr
ea
se
 a
fte
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Sa
al
 a
nd
 
Pa
rk
er
 
(20
03
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
an
d 
pr
ic
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
w
at
er
 
an
d 
se
w
er
ag
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s o
f E
n
gl
an
d 
an
d 
W
al
es
 
af
te
r t
he
 in
du
st
ry
 
is 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 a
nd
 a
 n
ew
 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
re
gi
m
e 
im
po
se
d 
in
 
19
89
. E
xa
m
in
es
 
joi
n
t 
im
pa
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d 
n
ew
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 r
eg
u
la
to
ry
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t o
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Fi
nd
 
n
o
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
 e
vi
de
n
ce
 th
at
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
,
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
gr
o
w
th
 
in
 
TF
P,
 
is 
im
pr
o
v
ed
 
by
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
—
de
sp
ite
 re
du
ct
io
n
s 
in
 
la
bo
r 
u
sa
ge
. 
A
lso
 
fin
d 
th
at
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
o
u
tp
u
t p
ric
es
 h
av
e 
o
u
ts
tr
ip
pe
d 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
pu
t p
ric
es
, l
ea
di
ng
 
to
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
hi
gh
er
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 p
ro
fit
s a
fte
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
 Ta
bl
e 
3.
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 o
f  
Em
pi
ri
ca
l S
tu
di
es
 
o
f P
ri
v
a
tiz
a
tio
n
 
in
 
La
tin
 
A
m
er
ic
a
 
 
St
u
dy
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
,
 
st
u
dy
 
pe
rio
d,
 a
nd
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
o
f e
m
pi
ric
al
 
fin
di
n
gs
 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
sio
n
s 
R
am
am
u
rt
i 
(19
96
) 
Su
rv
ey
s 
st
u
di
es
 o
f f
o
u
r 
te
le
co
m
,
 
tw
o
 
ai
rli
ne
, 
an
d 
o
n
e 
to
ll-
ro
ad
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
in
 
La
tin
 
A
m
er
ic
a 
du
rin
g 
pe
rio
d 
19
87
-1
99
1.
  A
lso
 
di
sc
u
ss
es
 
po
lit
ic
al
 e
co
no
m
ic
 is
su
es
 
an
d 
m
et
ho
ds
 
u
se
d 
to
 o
ve
rc
o
m
e 
bu
re
au
cr
at
ic
 a
nd
 id
eo
lo
gi
ca
l 
o
pp
os
iti
on
 
to
 d
iv
es
tit
ur
e.
 
Co
n
cl
u
de
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
v
er
y 
po
sit
iv
e 
fo
r 
te
le
co
m
s,
 
pa
rt
ly
 
du
e 
to
 
sc
o
pe
 
fo
r 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
,
 
ca
pi
ta
l i
n
v
es
tm
en
t, 
an
d 
at
tr
ac
tiv
en
es
s 
o
f o
ffe
r 
te
rm
s.
 M
u
ch
 
le
ss
 
sc
o
pe
 
fo
r 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 fo
r 
ai
rli
ne
s 
an
d 
ro
ad
s,
 a
n
d 
lit
tle
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
bs
er
v
ed
. 
R
am
am
u
rt
i 
(19
97
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
o
f F
er
ro
ca
ril
la
 
A
rg
en
tin
o
s,
 
th
e 
n
at
io
n
al
 
ra
ilr
o
ad
, i
n
 
19
90
. T
es
ts
 
w
he
th
er
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
,
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t, 
an
d 
ne
ed
 fo
r 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
(eq
ua
l t
o
 
1%
 
o
f G
D
P 
in
 
19
90
) c
ha
n
ge
 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
af
te
r 
di
v
es
tit
u
re
.
 
D
o
cu
m
en
ts
 
a 
37
0%
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t i
n
 
la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
an
d 
a 
78
.7
%
 
de
cl
in
e 
in
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t (
fro
m
 
92
,0
00
 to
 
19
,6
82
). S
er
v
ic
es
 
w
er
e 
ex
pa
nd
ed
 a
nd
 
im
pr
ov
ed
, a
nd
 d
el
iv
er
ed
 a
t l
ow
er
 c
o
st
 
to
 c
on
su
m
er
s.
 
N
ee
d 
fo
r o
pe
ra
tin
g 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
la
rg
el
y 
el
im
in
at
ed
. 
La
 
Po
rt
a 
an
d 
Ló
pe
z-
de
-
Si
la
n
es
 
(19
99
) 
Te
st
s 
w
he
th
er
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 2
18
 S
O
Es
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 th
ro
u
gh
 
Ju
n
e 
19
92
 im
pr
ov
es
 
af
te
r 
di
v
es
tm
en
t. 
Co
m
pa
re
s 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 w
ith
 
in
du
st
ry
-
m
at
ch
ed
 
fir
m
s,
 a
n
d 
sp
lit
s 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 
do
cu
m
en
te
d 
be
tw
ee
n
 
in
du
st
ry
 
an
d 
fir
m
-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
in
flu
en
ce
s.
 
O
u
tp
ut
 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
54
.3
%
,
 
w
hi
le
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t d
ec
lin
ed
 b
y 
ha
lf 
(th
o
u
gh
 
w
ag
es
 
fo
r 
re
m
ai
n
in
g 
w
o
rk
er
s 
in
cr
ea
se
d).
 Fi
rm
s 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 a
 2
4 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
po
in
t i
n
cr
ea
se
 in
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
,
 
el
im
in
at
in
g 
n
ee
d 
fo
r 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
eq
ua
l t
o
 
12
.7
%
 
o
f G
D
P.
 
H
ig
he
r 
pr
od
uc
t p
ric
es
 
ex
pl
ai
n
 
5%
 
o
f 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t; 
tr
an
sf
er
s 
fro
m
 
la
id
-o
ff 
w
o
rk
er
s,
 
31
%
, a
nd
 in
ce
n
tiv
e-
re
la
te
d 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
ga
in
s 
ac
co
u
n
t f
o
r 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 
64
%
.
 
Pa
m
bo
 a
nd
 
R
am
ire
z 
(20
01
) 
Pe
rfo
rm
s 
ex
 
po
st
 m
ea
su
rin
g 
an
d 
ec
o
n
o
m
et
ric
 a
n
al
ys
is 
of
 
30
 
la
rg
e 
Co
lo
m
bi
an
 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
an
d 
33
 p
ow
er
 
ge
n
er
at
io
n
 
pl
an
ts
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
19
93
-1
99
8 
pe
rio
d.
 
Em
pl
o
y 
bo
th
 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
an
al
ys
is 
an
d 
M
N
R
 
m
at
ch
ed
 
pr
e 
v
s 
po
st
-p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
te
st
s.
 
Pa
n
el
 d
at
a 
an
al
ys
is 
fin
ds
 v
er
y 
po
sit
iv
e 
re
su
lts
 fo
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
fir
m
s.
 
To
ta
l f
ac
to
r 
pr
od
u
ct
iv
ity
 
in
di
ce
s 
in
cr
ea
se
 fr
o
m
 
0.
27
 to
 
0.
50
 
po
in
ts
,
 
w
hi
le
 p
ro
fit
 ra
te
s i
n
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
1.
2 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
po
in
ts
.
 
Pr
o
du
ct
iv
e 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
in
 
po
w
er
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n
 
n
o
t s
ys
te
m
at
ic
al
ly
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 c
ha
ng
es
,
 
o
n
ce
 o
th
er
 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
ac
co
u
n
te
d 
fo
r.
 
G
al
ia
ni
,
 
G
er
tle
r 
an
d 
Sc
ha
rg
ro
ds
ky
 
(20
01
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
in
g 
w
at
er
 
se
rv
ic
es
 
o
n
 
th
e 
m
o
rt
al
ity
 
o
f y
o
u
n
g 
ch
ild
re
n
 
in
 
A
rg
en
tin
a.
 B
et
w
ee
n
 
19
91
 
an
d 
20
00
, 3
0%
 
o
f A
rg
en
tin
a’
s 
pu
bl
ic
 
w
at
er
 c
o
m
pa
n
ie
s 
co
v
er
in
g 
60
%
 
o
f t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
 
w
er
e 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
. E
sti
m
at
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
o
n
 
ch
ild
 
m
o
rt
al
ity
 
u
sin
g 
th
re
e 
di
ffe
re
n
t m
ea
su
re
s.
 
A
ll 
th
re
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
sh
o
w
 
th
at
 c
hi
ld
 m
o
rt
al
ity
 
fe
ll 
5 
to
 8
 p
er
ce
n
t i
n 
ar
ea
s 
th
at
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 th
ei
r w
at
er
 s
er
v
ic
es
.
 
In
cr
ea
se
 in
 
ac
ce
ss
 
to
 a
nd
 q
ua
lit
y 
o
f w
at
er
 
ca
u
se
d 
th
e 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 
m
o
rt
al
ity
.
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n
cr
ea
se
d,
 se
rv
ic
e 
pr
ov
isi
on
 
be
ca
m
e 
m
o
re
 e
ffi
ci
en
t a
nd
 q
ua
lit
y 
im
pr
ov
ed
. T
he
 n
u
m
be
r 
o
f p
eo
pl
e 
co
n
n
ec
te
d 
to
 th
e 
n
et
w
o
rk
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
dr
am
at
ic
al
ly
,
 
bu
t p
ric
es
 
di
d 
no
t. 
Es
ta
ch
e 
(20
02
) 
A
sk
s w
he
th
er
 A
rg
en
tin
a’
s 
19
90
s u
til
iti
es
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 
w
as
 
a 
cu
re
 o
r 
a 
di
se
as
e.
 C
er
ta
in
ly
,
 
th
e 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
ns
 
o
f A
rg
en
tin
a’
s 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
,
 
ga
s,
 
w
at
er
 a
n
d 
H
e 
fin
ds
 th
at
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
pe
r 
se
, 
w
as
 q
u
ite
 su
cc
es
sf
u
l: 
it 
ra
ise
d 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t 
re
v
en
u
es
 
fo
r 
th
e 
st
at
e 
an
d 
th
e 
n
ew
 
pr
iv
at
e 
op
er
at
or
s i
nc
re
as
ed
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
le
v
el
s s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
—
w
ith
o
u
t s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
ra
isi
n
g 
th
e 
ra
te
s 
th
ey
 
 sa
n
ita
tio
n
 
an
d 
te
le
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s 
u
til
iti
es
 a
re
 to
da
y 
th
e 
o
bje
ct
 o
f i
nt
en
se
 a
n
ge
r 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y,
 
bu
t E
st
ac
he
 
at
te
m
pt
s 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
th
is 
an
ge
r 
is 
ap
pr
o
pr
ia
te
. H
e 
fir
st
 n
o
te
s 
th
at
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
o
cc
u
rr
ed
 
jus
t b
ef
o
re
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y 
w
as
 g
rip
pe
d 
by
 
a 
m
as
siv
e 
po
lit
ic
al
 a
n
d 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
co
lla
ps
e 
an
d 
he
 
tr
ie
s t
o 
se
pa
ra
te
 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
o
v
er
w
he
lm
in
g 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f t
he
 c
o
lla
ps
e.
 
ch
ar
ge
d.
 T
he
 r
at
es
 
ch
ar
ge
d 
co
ns
u
m
er
s,
 
ho
w
ev
er
, 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
ly
,
 
sin
ce
 
th
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t e
x
pl
o
ite
d 
th
e 
n
ew
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
to
 
im
po
se
 
in
di
re
ct
 
ta
x
es
 
th
at
 
it 
co
u
ld
 n
o
t i
m
po
se
 th
ro
u
gh
 
di
re
ct
 
le
v
ie
s.
 
O
n
ce
 th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 c
ris
is 
be
ga
n
,
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t a
ct
io
ns
 
di
sc
rim
in
at
ed
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s a
n
d 
fo
re
ig
n
 
o
pe
ra
to
rs
 
w
er
e 
v
ili
fie
d 
as
 e
x
pl
o
ite
rs
 
w
he
n
 
th
ey
 
tr
ie
d 
to
 
ra
ise
 fe
es
 
in
 
lin
e 
w
ith
 
in
fla
tio
n
 
an
d 
de
v
al
u
at
io
n
.
 
B
irc
h 
an
d 
H
aa
r 
(20
00
)  
A
 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
st
u
dy
 
o
f t
he
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
ex
pe
rie
n
ce
 in
 
th
e 
la
st 
tw
o
 d
ec
ad
es
 
in
 
A
rg
en
tin
a,
 
B
ra
zi
l, 
Ch
ile
, C
o
lo
m
bi
a,
 
M
ex
ic
o
, 
Pe
ru
,
 
V
en
ez
u
el
a 
an
d 
so
m
e 
Ca
rib
be
an
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 
 
Th
e 
au
th
o
rs
 
fin
d 
siz
ea
bl
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
o
n
 
th
e 
m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
co
n
di
tio
n
s 
(bo
th
 
in
 
th
e 
sh
o
rt
 a
n
d 
lo
n
g 
ru
n
). T
he
y 
al
so
 
sh
o
w
 
a 
po
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
o
n
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
an
d 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
n
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t. 
 
Ch
isa
ri,
 E
sta
ch
e 
an
d 
Ro
m
er
o
 
(19
99
)  
Th
e 
st
u
dy
 
as
se
ss
es
 
m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 a
n
d 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n
al
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
in
 
A
rg
en
tin
a’
s 
ga
s,
 
el
ec
tri
ci
ty
,
 
te
le
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s,
 
an
d 
w
at
er
 s
ec
to
rs
.
 
It 
us
es
 
a 
co
m
pu
ta
bl
e 
ge
n
er
al
 e
qu
ili
br
iu
m
 
m
o
de
l. 
 
Th
e 
st
u
dy
 
co
n
cl
u
de
s t
ha
t e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
re
gu
la
tio
n
 
tr
an
sla
te
s 
in
to
 a
n
n
u
al
 g
ai
ns
 
o
f 
ab
o
u
t 1
.
25
 
bi
lli
on
 
o
f G
D
P.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
ca
n
n
o
t b
e 
bl
am
ed
 
fo
r 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
s 
it 
m
ay
 
be
 
du
e 
to
 
in
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
re
gu
la
tio
n
.
 
 
Ch
on
g 
an
d 
Sa
n
ch
ez
 (2
00
3) 
A
 
de
ta
ile
d 
an
al
ys
is 
o
f t
he
 c
o
n
tr
ac
tu
al
 a
rra
ng
em
en
ts
 
o
f 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
ns
 
an
d 
co
nc
es
sio
n
s 
in
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
u
re
. 
It 
co
ve
rs
 
fo
u
r 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s: 
Br
az
il,
 C
hi
le
, C
ol
om
bi
a 
an
d 
Pe
ru
.
 
It 
co
n
cl
ud
es
 th
at
 c
le
ar
,
 
ho
m
o
ge
n
eo
u
s,
 tr
an
sp
ar
en
t a
n
d 
cr
ed
ib
le
 in
st
itu
tio
n
al
 
pr
o
ce
ss
es
 d
u
rin
g 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
yi
el
d 
po
sit
iv
e 
o
u
tc
om
es
.
 
 
Cl
ar
ke
 
an
d 
Cu
ll 
(20
01
)  
Th
is 
st
u
dy
 
u
se
s 
ev
id
en
ce
 fr
o
m
 
th
e 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pr
og
ra
m
 
o
f 
pr
ov
in
ci
al
 
ba
nk
s 
in
 
A
rg
en
tin
a 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
19
90
s. 
It 
te
st
s 
ec
o
n
o
m
et
ric
al
ly
 
ho
w
 
po
lit
ic
al
 c
o
n
st
ra
in
ts
 a
ffe
ct
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
s 
du
rin
g 
ba
n
k 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
 
It 
fin
ds
 th
at
 p
ro
v
in
ce
s 
w
ith
 
hi
gh
 
fis
ca
l d
ef
ic
its
 
w
er
e 
w
ill
in
g 
to
,
 
fir
st
, a
cc
ep
t 
la
yo
ffs
; a
n
d 
se
co
n
d,
 
to
 g
ua
ra
n
te
e 
a 
la
rg
er
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 b
an
k’
s 
po
rt
fo
lio
 
in
 
re
tu
rn
 
fo
r 
a 
hi
gh
er
 
sa
le
 p
ric
e.
  
G
al
al
, J
o
n
es
, 
Ta
n
do
n,
 
an
d 
V
o
ge
lsa
n
g 
(19
94
)  
It 
co
m
pa
re
s 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 1
2 
la
rg
e 
fir
m
s 
fro
m
 
Ch
ile
 a
n
d 
M
ex
ic
o
. 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
co
v
er
ed
 a
re
 
m
o
st
ly
 
ai
rli
n
es
 a
n
d 
re
gu
la
te
d 
u
til
iti
es
. 
Th
is 
st
u
dy
 
fin
ds
 
n
et
 w
el
fa
re
 g
ai
ns
 
in
 
11
 o
f 1
2 
ca
se
s 
co
v
er
ed
. G
ai
ns
 
ar
e 
o
n
 
av
er
ag
e 
eq
ua
l t
o 
26
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 fi
rm
s’
 
pr
e-
di
v
es
tit
u
re
 s
al
es
.
 
 
It 
fin
ds
 
n
o
 
ca
se
 w
he
re
 w
o
rk
er
s 
w
er
e 
m
ad
e 
w
o
rs
e 
o
ff,
 
an
d 
3 
ca
se
s 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 
w
o
rk
er
s'
 
co
n
di
tio
n
s 
im
pr
o
v
ed
.
 
 
H
ac
he
tte
 a
n
d 
Lu
de
rs
 
(19
94
)  
Th
is 
st
u
dy
 
an
al
yz
es
 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
n
ce
 in
 
10
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
o
f 1
44
 p
riv
at
e,
 p
ub
lic
 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
in
 
Ch
ile
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
fro
m
 
19
74
–1
98
7.
  
It 
fin
ds
 
n
o
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 
be
ha
v
io
r 
am
o
n
g 
pu
bl
ic
,
 
pr
iv
at
e 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
fir
m
s 
th
at
 o
pe
ra
te
 u
n
de
r 
sim
ila
r s
et
s 
of
 
ru
le
s a
n
d 
re
gu
la
tio
n
s.
 
Pe
tr
az
zi
ni
 
an
d 
Cl
ar
k 
(19
96
)  
U
sin
g 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 T
el
ec
om
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s 
U
ni
on
 
da
ta
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
19
94
, i
t t
es
ts
 
w
he
th
er
 d
er
eg
u
la
tio
n
 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
im
pa
ct
 th
e 
le
v
el
 a
n
d 
gr
o
w
th
 
o
f t
el
ed
en
sit
y,
 
pr
ic
es
,
 
se
rv
ic
e 
qu
al
ity
 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
Th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
co
ve
rs
 
26
 
de
v
el
o
pi
n
g 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
so
m
e 
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
an
 
D
er
eg
u
la
tio
n 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
ar
e 
bo
th
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
sig
ni
fic
an
t 
im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 
in
 
th
e 
le
v
el
 a
nd
 
gr
o
w
th
 
o
f t
el
ed
en
sit
y,
 
bu
t h
av
e 
n
o
 
co
n
sis
te
nt
 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
 
o
f s
er
v
ic
e.
 D
er
eg
u
la
tio
n
 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
lo
w
er
 p
ric
es
 
an
d 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t; 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
ha
s 
th
e 
o
pp
os
ite
 
ef
fe
ct
.
 
 
 n
at
io
n
s.
 
 
Pi
n
he
iro
 (1
99
6) 
 
It 
an
al
yz
es
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 5
0 
fo
rm
er
 B
ra
zi
lia
n 
SO
Es
 
be
fo
re
 a
n
d 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
It 
u
se
s 
da
ta
 
u
p 
u
n
til
 
19
94
. 
Th
e 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 u
se
d 
ar
e 
n
et
 s
al
es
, 
n
et
 p
ro
fit
s, 
n
et
 a
ss
et
s,
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t, 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t a
n
d 
in
de
bt
ed
n
es
s.
 
 
Th
e 
st
u
dy
 
co
n
cl
u
de
s t
ha
t p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
ha
s 
im
pr
ov
ed
 th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 
fir
m
s.
 
It 
sh
o
w
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
n
u
ll 
hy
po
th
es
is 
o
f n
o
 
ch
an
ge
 
in
 
be
ha
v
io
r 
is 
re
jec
te
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
,
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
,
 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
an
d 
in
v
es
tm
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
. I
t f
in
ds
 
a 
sig
ni
fic
an
t n
eg
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
 
R
o
s 
(19
99
)  
U
se
s 
IT
U
 
da
ta
 
an
d 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
s 
to
 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
o
n
 
n
et
w
o
rk
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n
 
an
d 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
.
 
Th
e 
st
u
dy
 
co
v
er
s 
11
0 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
19
86
–1
99
5 
pe
rio
d.
  
Co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
w
ith
 
at
 
le
as
t 5
0 
pe
rc
en
t o
f p
riv
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 in
 
th
e 
m
ai
n
 
te
le
co
m
 
fir
m
 
ha
v
e 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
hi
gh
er
 
te
le
de
n
sit
y 
le
v
el
s a
n
d 
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
s.
 B
o
th
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
in
cr
ea
se
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
.
 
H
ow
ev
er
,
 
o
n
ly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
is 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
n
et
w
o
rk
 
ex
pa
n
sio
n
.
 
 
Sa
nc
he
z 
an
d 
Co
ro
n
a 
(19
93
)  
U
se
s 
a 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
ca
se
-
st
u
dy
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
to
 a
na
ly
ze
 th
e 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
ex
pe
rie
n
ce
s 
o
f A
rg
en
tin
a,
 C
hi
le
, C
ol
om
bi
a 
an
d 
M
ex
ic
o
. 
It 
fo
cu
se
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n
 
pr
io
r 
to
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
; o
n
 
v
al
ua
tio
n
,
 
sa
le
 m
ec
ha
n
ism
s,
 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
an
d 
su
pe
rv
isi
on
,
 
an
d 
on
 
th
e 
fis
ca
l a
nd
 
m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 im
pa
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
 
Th
e 
au
th
o
rs
 
fin
d 
gr
ea
t d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
in
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
co
v
er
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
st
u
dy
.
 
Th
ey
 
co
n
cl
u
de
 
th
at
 fi
rm
s,
 in
st
itu
tio
n
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
n
s 
n
ee
d 
su
ffi
ci
en
t t
im
e 
to
 
pr
ep
ar
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pr
oc
es
s 
to
 b
e 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
.  
Tr
u
jill
o,
 
M
ar
tin
,
 
Es
ta
ch
e,
 a
n
d 
Ca
m
po
s (
20
02
)  
Th
is 
stu
dy
 
u
se
s 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
of
 
21
 
La
tin
 
A
m
er
ic
an
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
co
v
er
in
g 
fro
m
 
19
85
 to
 
19
98
. I
t u
se
s 
po
ol
ed
 a
nd
 p
an
el
 
da
ta
 
w
ith
 
fix
ed
 a
nd
 ra
nd
o
m
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
to
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 e
ffe
ct
s 
o
f p
riv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
 
in
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
u
re
.
 
 
Th
e 
au
th
o
rs
 fi
n
d 
th
at
 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
in
v
o
lv
em
en
t i
n
 
u
til
iti
es
 a
n
d 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
 h
av
e 
m
in
im
al
 
po
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
n
 
G
D
P.
 T
he
re
 is
 
cr
o
w
di
n
g 
o
u
t o
f p
riv
at
e 
in
v
es
tm
en
t, 
pr
iv
at
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
 
re
du
ce
s 
re
cu
rr
en
t e
x
pe
nd
itu
re
s 
ex
ce
pt
 in
 
tr
an
sp
or
t w
he
re
 it
 
ha
s 
th
e 
o
pp
os
ite
 
ef
fe
ct
.
 
Th
e 
n
et
 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
n
 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
ct
o
r 
ac
co
u
n
t i
s 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n.
 
 
W
al
lst
en
 
(20
01
)  
A
n
al
ys
es
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
f t
el
ec
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 
re
fo
rm
s.
 
It 
ex
pl
o
re
s 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
,
 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
o
n
 
te
le
co
m
 
fir
m
s'
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Th
is 
st
u
dy
 
co
v
er
s 
30
 A
fri
ca
n
 
an
d 
La
tin
 
A
m
er
ic
an
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
19
84
-1
99
7 
pe
rio
d.
  
It 
in
di
ca
te
s 
th
at
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n
 
is 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 te
le
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n 
se
rv
ic
es
 
an
d 
w
ith
 
de
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
its
 
co
st
s.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
is 
he
lp
fu
l o
n
ly
 
if 
co
u
pl
ed
 
w
ith
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e,
 in
de
pe
n
de
n
t r
eg
u
la
tio
n
.
 
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
co
n
cl
u
de
s 
th
at
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n
 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
is 
be
st
. 
Pr
iv
at
iz
in
g 
a 
m
o
n
o
po
ly
 
w
ith
o
u
t r
eg
ul
at
o
ry
 
re
fo
rm
s 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
av
o
id
ed
.  
 
 Ta
bl
e 
4.
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 o
f E
m
pi
ri
ca
l S
tu
di
es
 
o
f P
ri
v
a
tiz
a
tio
n
 
in
 
th
e 
Tr
a
n
sit
io
n
 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s 
o
f C
en
tr
a
l a
n
d 
Ea
st
er
n
 
Eu
ro
pe
 
 
St
u
dy
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
,
 
st
u
dy
 
pe
rio
d,
 a
nd
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
o
f e
m
pi
ric
al
 
fin
di
n
gs
 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
sio
n
s 
Po
hl
,
 
A
n
de
rs
o
n
,
 
Cl
ae
ss
en
s,
 
an
d 
D
jan
ko
v
 
(19
97
) 
Co
m
pa
re
s 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t o
f r
es
tr
u
ct
u
rin
g 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 b
y 
o
v
er
 6
,3
00
 
pr
iv
at
e 
an
d 
sta
te
-
o
w
n
ed
 fi
rm
s 
in
 
se
v
en
 
ea
st
er
n
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
du
rin
g 
19
92
-1
99
5.
 U
se
s 
six
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 
ex
am
in
e 
w
hi
ch
 re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
im
pr
o
v
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
th
e 
m
o
st
.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
dr
am
at
ic
al
ly
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
lik
el
ih
o
o
d 
an
d 
su
cc
es
s.
 F
irm
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
fo
r 
4 
ye
ar
s 
w
ill
 in
cr
ea
se
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
3-
5 
tim
es
 
m
o
re
 
th
an
 
a 
sim
ila
r S
O
E.
 L
itt
le
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 b
as
ed
 
o
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
of
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
bu
t o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 &
 
fin
an
ci
n
g 
ef
fe
ct
s 
im
pa
ct
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g.
 
Fr
yd
m
an
,
 
G
ra
y,
 
H
es
se
l a
n
d 
Ra
pa
cz
yn
sk
i 
(19
99
) 
Co
m
pa
re
s 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
ed
 a
nd
 st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 fi
rm
s 
in
 
th
e 
tr
an
sit
io
n 
ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s 
o
f C
en
tr
al
 E
u
ro
pe
, a
nd
 a
sk
s 
th
e 
qu
es
tio
n
 
“
w
he
n
 
do
es
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
w
o
rk
?”
 
Ex
am
in
es
 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
u
re
 o
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 u
sin
g 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 9
0 
sta
te
-
o
w
n
ed
 a
nd
 1
28
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s 
in
 
th
e 
Cz
ec
h 
R
ep
ub
lic
,
 
H
u
n
ga
ry
 
an
d 
Po
la
n
d.
 
Em
pl
o
y 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
m
et
ho
ds
 to
 
iso
la
te
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 e
ffe
ct
s.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
“
w
o
rk
s,
”
 
bu
t o
n
ly
 
w
he
n
 
fir
m
 
is 
co
n
tr
o
lle
d 
by
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
o
w
n
er
s 
(ot
he
r 
th
an
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
o
r 
em
pl
o
ye
es
). P
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
ad
ds
 
o
v
er
 1
8 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
po
in
ts
 
to
 
th
e 
an
n
u
al
 
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
 
o
f a
 fi
rm
 
so
ld
 
to
 
a 
do
m
es
tic
 
fin
an
ci
al
 c
om
pa
n
y,
 
an
d 
12
 p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 
po
in
ts 
w
he
n
 
so
ld
 to
 a
 fo
re
ig
n 
bu
ye
r.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
to
 
an
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
o
w
n
er
 
al
so
 
ad
ds
 
ab
o
u
t 9
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
po
in
ts
 to
 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
.
 
Fu
rt
he
r,
 
ga
in
 
do
es
 n
o
t c
om
e 
at
 
th
e 
ex
pe
ns
e 
o
f h
ig
he
r 
u
n
em
pl
o
ym
en
t; 
in
sid
er
 c
on
tr
o
lle
d 
fir
m
s 
ar
e 
m
u
ch
 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
re
, 
bu
t o
u
ts
id
er
-
co
n
tr
o
lle
d 
fir
m
s 
gr
o
w
 
fa
st
er
.
 
Sh
o
w
s 
th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f e
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
rs
hi
p 
in
 
re
v
iv
in
g 
sa
le
s g
ro
w
th
.
 
B
er
g,
 
B
o
re
n
sz
te
in
,
 
Sa
ha
y 
an
d 
Ze
tte
lm
ey
er
 
(19
99
) 
U
sin
g 
m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 d
at
a 
fro
m
 
26
 
tr
an
sit
io
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
fo
r 
19
90
-1
99
6,
 e
xa
m
in
es
 
re
la
tiv
e 
ro
le
s 
o
f m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
,
 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l p
o
lic
ie
s, 
an
d 
in
iti
al
 c
o
n
di
tio
n
s 
in
 
ex
pl
ai
n
in
g 
th
e 
la
rg
e 
o
bs
er
v
ed
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 
o
u
tp
u
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
fte
r 
tr
an
sit
io
n
 
be
ga
n
. 
R
es
u
lts
 
po
in
t t
o
 
th
e 
pr
ee
m
in
en
ce
 o
f s
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l r
ef
o
rm
s 
o
v
er
 b
ot
h 
in
iti
al
 
co
n
di
tio
n
s 
an
d 
m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 in
 
ex
pl
ai
ni
n
g 
cr
o
ss
-
co
u
n
tr
y 
di
ffe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
n
d 
th
e 
tim
in
g 
o
f r
ec
o
v
er
y 
fro
m
 
th
e 
sh
ar
p 
re
ce
ss
io
n
 
th
at
 
hi
t e
v
er
y 
tr
an
sit
io
n
 
ec
o
n
o
m
y 
in
 
th
e 
ea
rly
 
19
90
s. 
Fr
yd
m
an
,
 
G
ra
y,
 
H
es
se
l a
n
d 
Ra
pa
cz
yn
sk
i 
(20
00
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
im
po
sit
io
n
 
o
f h
ar
d 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
 
is 
al
on
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t t
o 
im
pr
ov
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 in
 
th
e 
Cz
ec
h 
R
ep
ub
lic
,
 
H
u
n
ga
ry
 
an
d 
Po
la
n
d.
 
Em
pl
o
ys
 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 2
16
 fi
rm
s,
 
sp
lit
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 
(31
%
), p
riv
at
iz
ed
 
(43
%
), a
n
d 
pr
iv
at
e 
(26
%)
 fi
rm
s.
 
Fi
nd
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
al
on
e 
ad
ds
 
n
ea
rly
 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
 
to
 th
e 
re
v
en
u
e 
gr
o
w
th
 
o
f a
 fi
rm
 
so
ld
 
to
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
o
w
n
er
s.
 
M
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t, 
fin
ds
 
th
at
 
th
e 
th
re
at
 
o
f h
ar
d 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
 
fo
r 
po
or
ly
 
pe
rfo
rm
in
g 
SO
Es
 
fa
lte
rs
,
 
sin
ce
 g
o
v
er
n
m
en
ts
 a
re
 u
n
w
ill
in
g 
to
 
al
lo
w
 
th
es
e 
fir
m
s 
to
 
fa
il.
 T
he
 
br
un
t o
f S
O
Es
’
 
lo
w
er
 c
re
di
tw
o
rt
hi
n
es
s 
fa
lls
 
o
n
 
st
at
e 
cr
ed
ito
rs
.
 
Fr
yd
m
an
, 
H
es
se
l 
an
d 
Ra
pa
cz
yn
sk
i 
(20
00
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
w
he
th
er
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
Ce
nt
ra
l E
u
ro
pe
an
 
fir
m
s 
co
n
tr
o
lle
d 
by
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
in
v
es
to
rs
 a
re
 m
o
re
 
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
ria
l—
in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f a
bi
lit
y 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 r
ev
en
u
es
—
th
an
 
fir
m
s 
co
n
tr
ol
le
d 
by
 
in
sid
er
s o
r 
th
e 
st
at
e.
 S
tu
dy
 
em
pl
o
ys
 
su
rv
ey
 
da
ta
 
fro
m
 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 5
06
 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
in
 
th
e 
Cz
ec
h 
R
ep
ub
lic
, H
u
n
ga
ry
 
an
d 
Po
la
n
d.
 
D
oc
um
en
ts
 
th
at
 a
ll 
sta
te
 a
n
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
en
ga
ge
 
in
 
sim
ila
r 
ty
pe
s o
f 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g,
 
bu
t t
ha
t p
ro
du
ct
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
by
 
fir
m
s 
o
w
n
ed
 b
y 
o
u
ts
id
e 
in
v
es
to
rs
 is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
m
o
re
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e,
 in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f r
ev
en
u
e 
ge
n
er
at
io
n
,
 
th
an
 
by
 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 
o
th
er
 ty
pe
s o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
. C
o
n
cl
u
de
s t
he
 m
o
re
 
en
tr
ep
re
ne
u
ria
l b
eh
av
io
r 
o
f o
u
ts
id
er
-o
w
n
ed
 fi
rm
s 
is 
du
e 
to
 
in
ce
n
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s,
 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 
hu
m
an
 
ca
pi
ta
l e
ffe
ct
s,
 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n—
sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
 
 gr
ea
te
r r
ea
di
ne
ss
 
to
 ta
ke
 
ris
ks
.
 
Zi
n
n
es
, 
Ei
la
t a
nd
 
Sa
ch
s 
(20
01
) 
Em
pl
o
ys
 
a 
u
n
iq
u
e 
pa
ne
l d
at
as
et
 
o
f m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
, 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
, 
an
d 
in
di
ca
to
r v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
m
ea
su
rin
g 
th
e 
de
pt
h 
an
d 
br
ea
dt
h 
o
f r
ef
o
rm
 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
fo
r 
24
 
tr
an
sit
io
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
“
ch
an
ge
 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
”
 
(pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
) a
lo
n
e 
is 
en
o
u
gh
 
to
 p
ro
m
o
te
 im
pr
ov
ed
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
v
er
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
90
-9
8,
 o
r w
he
th
er
 “
de
ep
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
”
 
in
v
o
lv
in
g 
im
pr
ov
ed
 c
or
po
ra
te
 g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
,
 
en
ha
n
ce
d 
pr
ud
en
tia
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n
 
an
d 
ha
rd
en
in
g 
o
f b
ud
ge
t c
o
n
st
ra
in
ts
 
is 
al
so
 
re
qu
ire
d.
 D
ev
el
op
 a
n 
O
BC
A
 
in
di
ca
to
r v
ar
ia
bl
e 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
co
u
n
tr
y 
m
ea
su
rin
g 
th
e 
br
ea
dt
h 
an
d 
de
pt
h 
o
f r
ef
o
rm
s,
 
an
d 
in
cl
u
de
s 
th
is 
v
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 
re
gr
es
sio
n
s.
 
U
se
 fo
u
r 
m
ea
su
re
s 
o
f e
co
n
o
m
y-
w
id
e 
m
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
s 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
.
 
R
eg
ar
dl
es
s 
o
f p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
, f
in
ds
 
th
at
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 g
ai
ns
 
co
m
e 
o
n
ly
 
fro
m
 
de
ep
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n—
m
ea
n
in
g 
th
at
 
ch
an
ge
 
o
f t
itl
e 
re
fo
rm
s 
o
n
ly
 
yi
el
d 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
ga
in
s 
af
te
r 
ke
y 
in
st
itu
tio
n
al
 
an
d 
ag
en
cy
-
re
la
te
d 
re
fo
rm
s 
ha
v
e 
ex
ce
ed
ed
 c
er
ta
in
 
th
re
sh
o
ld
 le
ve
ls.
 
B
y 
th
em
se
lv
es
,
 
ch
an
ge
 
o
f t
itl
e 
re
fo
rm
s 
n
ev
er
 
ha
v
e 
a 
sig
ni
fic
an
t i
m
pa
ct
 
o
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
bu
t t
he
 h
ig
he
r 
th
e 
O
BC
A
 
le
v
el
 a
 c
ou
nt
ry
 
ha
s,
 
th
e 
m
o
re
 
po
sit
iv
e 
is 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f a
n
 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
ch
an
ge
 
o
f t
itl
e 
on
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
W
hi
le
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
m
at
te
rs
, 
in
st
itu
tio
n
s 
m
at
te
r 
jus
t a
s 
m
u
ch
.
 
Ca
rli
n,
 
Fr
ie
s,
 
Sc
ha
ffe
r 
an
d 
Se
ab
rig
ht
 
(20
01
) 
U
se
s 
da
ta
 fr
o
m
 
a 
19
99
 su
rv
ey
 
o
f 3
30
5 
fir
m
s 
in
 
25
 tr
an
sit
io
n 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s t
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
th
at
 p
ro
m
o
te
 re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
by
 
fir
m
s 
an
d 
en
ha
n
ce
 s
u
bs
eq
ue
n
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
—
as
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
gr
o
w
th
 
in
 
sa
le
s 
an
d 
in
 
sa
le
s 
pe
r 
em
pl
o
ye
e 
o
v
er
 a
 3
-y
ea
r 
pe
rio
d.
 
Su
rv
ey
 
in
cl
u
de
s 
ab
ou
t 1
25
 co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
fro
m
 
ea
ch
 
o
f t
he
 2
5 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s, 
w
ith
 
la
rg
er
 s
am
pl
es
 
fro
m
 
Po
la
nd
 
an
d 
U
kr
ai
n
e 
(20
0+
 
fir
m
s) 
an
d 
Ru
ss
ia
 
(50
0+
 fi
rm
s).
 Ju
st
 
o
v
er
 o
n
e-
ha
lf 
w
er
e 
n
ew
ly
-
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 
fir
m
s,
 8
%
 
w
er
e 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
to
 
in
sid
er
s,
 
22
%
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
to
 
o
u
ts
id
er
s 
an
d 
16
%
 
re
m
ai
n
ed
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
. 
Fi
n
ds
 th
at
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 h
as
 a
n
 
im
po
rt
an
t a
n
d 
n
o
n
-
m
o
n
o
to
n
ic
 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
n
 
th
e 
gr
o
w
th
 
o
f s
al
es
 
an
d 
la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
,
 
w
ith
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 im
pr
ov
in
g 
m
o
re
 fo
r 
fir
m
s 
fa
ci
ng
 
1-
3 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s t
ha
n
 
fo
r 
m
o
n
o
po
lis
ts
 
(on
e-
fo
u
rt
h 
o
f S
O
Es
 fa
ce
 n
o
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
fo
r 
th
ei
r m
ai
n 
pr
o
du
ct
s 
in
 
th
ei
r d
o
m
es
tic
 
m
ar
ke
ts
) o
r 
fir
m
s 
fa
ci
n
g 
m
an
y 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s.
 
Co
n
tr
o
lli
n
g 
fo
r 
o
th
er
 
fa
ct
or
s,
 fi
n
d 
n
o
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
 r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
N
ew
ly
 
cr
ea
te
d 
fir
m
s 
ge
n
er
al
ly
 
o
u
t-
pe
rfo
rm
 
al
l o
th
er
 
ca
te
go
rie
s. 
O
ld
 fi
rm
s 
(pr
iva
tiz
ed
 a
nd
 S
O
Es
) a
re 
m
u
ch
 
m
o
re
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 c
ut
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t t
ha
n
 
n
ew
 
en
tr
an
ts
,
 
bu
t a
u
th
o
rs
 
fin
d 
so
m
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 
th
at
 
pr
iv
at
e 
fir
m
s 
(ne
w
 
en
tr
an
ts
 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
) a
re 
mo
re
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 
en
ga
ge
 
in
 
n
ew
 
pr
o
du
ct
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t. 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 fi
n
d 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
to
 
be
 
a 
m
o
re
 
po
w
er
fu
l i
n
flu
en
ce
 o
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 th
an
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
, p
er
 se
.
 
 
A
ng
el
uc
ci
, 
Es
tri
n,
 
K
on
in
gs
 
an
d 
Zo
lk
ie
w
sk
i 
(20
01
) 
A
na
ly
ze
s 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
an
d 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
o
n
 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
to
ta
l f
ac
to
r 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
(T
FP
), i
n
 
th
re
e 
tr
an
sit
io
n 
ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
ye
ar
s 
19
94
-1
99
8.
 
U
se
s 
re
po
rte
d 
co
m
pa
n
y 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
 fo
r 
19
94
 a
nd
 1
99
8 
fo
r 
17
,
57
0 
Po
lis
h,
 
an
d 
fo
r 
19
97
-9
8 
fo
r 
1,
50
0 
Bu
lg
ar
ia
n
 
an
d 
2,
04
7 
Ro
m
an
ia
n
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s.
 
Te
st
s 
w
he
th
er
 p
riv
at
e 
fo
re
ig
n-
ow
n
ed
 fi
rm
s 
o
u
tp
er
fo
rm
 
pr
iv
at
e 
do
m
es
tic
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s, 
an
d 
w
he
th
er
 th
es
e 
bo
th
 
o
u
tp
er
fo
rm
 
SO
Es
.
 
Fi
nd
s 
th
at
 (1
) c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
pr
es
su
re
 (m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
m
ar
ke
t s
tr
u
ct
ur
e) 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
hi
gh
er
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
in
 
al
l t
hr
ee
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s; 
(2)
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
im
po
rt
 p
en
et
ra
tio
n
 
is 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
in
 
Po
la
nd
,
 
bu
t n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
in
 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 a
nd
 
R
om
an
ia
; (
3) 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
pr
es
su
re
 
ha
s 
st
ro
n
ge
r 
ef
fe
ct
s 
in
 
pr
iv
at
e 
fir
m
s 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
hi
gh
er
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 in
 
m
o
re
 c
o
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
se
ct
or
s;
 
(4)
 pr
iva
tiz
at
io
n 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
be
tte
r f
irm
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
n
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
o
u
t-
pe
rfo
rm
 
SO
Es
 
in
 
al
l t
hr
ee
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s. 
O
v
er
al
l, 
fin
d 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
co
m
pl
em
en
ta
rit
ie
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
pr
es
su
re
 
an
d 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
.
 
Cl
ae
ss
en
s 
an
d 
Ex
am
in
es
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 6
,3
54
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 a
nd
 
Fi
n
ds
 
th
at
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
sa
le
s 
 D
jan
ko
v
 
(20
02
) 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 fi
rm
s 
in
 
se
v
en
 
tr
an
sit
io
n
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s 
o
v
er
 th
e 
19
91
-
95
 p
er
io
d,
 a
nd
 te
st
 
w
he
th
er
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
im
pr
ov
es
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
(as
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
sa
le
s 
an
d 
la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
). S
am
pl
e 
in
cl
u
de
s 
al
l m
an
u
fa
ct
ur
in
g 
fir
m
s 
th
at
 a
re
 re
gi
st
er
ed
 a
s s
ta
te
-
o
w
n
ed
 in
 
19
91
 a
nd
 h
av
e 
m
o
re
 
th
an
 
25
 e
m
pl
o
ye
es
.
 
H
av
e 
fu
ll 
ba
la
n
ce
 s
he
et
 
an
d 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
fo
r 
19
92
-9
5,
 
an
d 
co
ns
tr
u
ct
 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
sh
o
w
in
g 
ev
o
lu
tio
n
 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 o
ve
r 
pe
rio
d.
 
an
d 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
 
an
d,
 
to
 
a 
le
ss
er
 
ex
te
nt
,
 
w
ith
 
fe
w
er
 
job
 
lo
ss
es
. 
 
In
 
six
 o
f s
ev
en
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
fir
m
s 
sh
o
w
 
hi
gh
er
 
sa
le
s 
gr
o
w
th
 
o
r 
sm
al
le
r d
ec
lin
es
 
in
 
sa
le
s 
th
an
 
SO
Es
,
 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
re
du
ce
 th
ei
r 
sa
le
s f
o
rc
es
 
by
 
an
 
av
er
ag
e 
6.
11
%
 v
er
su
s 
7.
42
%
 fo
r 
SO
Es
 
(si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t 
di
ffe
re
n
ce
). P
o
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
is 
st
ro
n
ge
r 
in
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 a
n
d 
sta
tis
tic
al
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
 a
s 
th
e 
tim
e 
el
ap
se
d 
sin
ce
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
s.
 
Cl
ae
ss
en
s,
 
D
jan
ko
v
, 
an
d 
Po
hl
 
(19
97
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
 
o
f p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 
fo
r 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 7
06
 C
ze
ch
 
fir
m
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
19
92
-1
99
5.
 
U
sin
g 
To
bi
ns
-
Q,
 
te
st
s 
w
he
th
er
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
u
re
 o
r 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f 
o
u
ts
id
e 
m
o
n
ito
r 
(ba
n
k 
o
r 
in
v
es
tm
en
t f
u
n
d) 
im
pr
o
v
es
 Q
 m
o
re
 
th
an
 
di
sp
er
se
d 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
.  
D
oc
um
en
t t
ha
t p
riv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
do
 p
ro
sp
er
, 
pr
im
ar
ily
 
be
ca
us
e 
o
f t
he
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
u
re
 th
at
 re
su
lts
.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
e 
m
o
re
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 th
e 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
th
e 
hi
gh
er
 is
 
th
e 
fir
m
’
s 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
u
at
io
n
.
 
La
rg
e 
st
ak
es
 
o
w
n
ed
 b
y 
ba
nk
-
sp
on
so
re
d 
fu
n
ds
 
an
d 
str
at
eg
ic
 in
v
es
to
rs
 
ar
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 
v
al
u
e-
en
ha
n
ci
n
g 
W
ei
ss
 a
n
d 
N
ik
iti
n
 
(19
98
) 
A
na
ly
ze
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 b
y 
in
ve
st
m
en
t f
u
n
ds
 
o
n
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 1
25
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 C
ze
ch
 
fir
m
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
93
-1
99
5.
 A
ss
es
s 
th
es
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
by
 
m
ea
su
rin
g 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
n
d 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
th
e 
co
m
po
sit
io
n 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 a
t t
he
 s
ta
rt
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
U
se
 r
o
bu
st
 
es
tim
at
io
n
 
te
ch
n
iq
u
es
, 
in
 
ad
di
tio
n
 
to
 
O
LS
,
 
sin
ce
 d
at
a 
st
ro
n
gl
y 
re
jec
t 
n
o
rm
al
ity
.  
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 
an
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
 
joi
nt
ly
 
af
fe
ct
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s.
 
Co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 in
 
th
e 
ha
n
ds
 o
f a
 
la
rg
e 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
,
 
o
th
er
 
th
an
 
an
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t f
un
d 
o
r 
co
m
pa
n
y,
 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 
(fo
r 
al
l m
ea
su
re
s 
o
f p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
). C
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 b
y 
fu
nd
s 
do
es
 
n
o
t i
m
pr
ov
e 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Pr
el
im
in
ar
y 
po
st-
19
96
 d
at
a 
su
gg
es
ts
 th
at
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t f
u
n
d 
le
gi
sla
tio
n
 m
ay
 
im
pr
o
v
e 
th
ei
r 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Cl
ae
ss
en
s 
an
d 
D
jan
ko
v
 
(19
99
a) 
St
u
dy
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t t
u
rn
o
v
er
 
o
n
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
an
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 7
06
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 C
ze
ch
 
fir
m
s 
o
v
er
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
93
-1
99
7.
 E
xa
m
in
e 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
la
bo
r 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
.
 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f n
ew
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
sig
ni
fic
an
t i
m
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 
in
 
pr
o
fit
 
m
ar
gi
n
s 
an
d 
la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
,
 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 
if 
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
ar
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
pr
iv
at
e 
o
w
n
er
s.
 
N
ew
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 
th
e 
N
at
io
n
al
 
Pr
op
er
ty
 
Fu
n
d 
al
so
 
im
pr
o
v
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
th
o
u
gh
 
n
o
t b
y 
as
 m
u
ch
.
 
Cl
ae
ss
en
s 
an
d 
D
jan
ko
v
 
(19
99
b) 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 c
on
ce
n
tr
at
io
n 
an
d 
co
rp
or
at
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 fo
r 
70
6 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 C
ze
ch
 
fir
m
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
92
-1
99
7.
 U
se
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
an
d 
la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
as
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
o
f c
o
rp
or
at
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Fi
nd
s 
th
at
 c
on
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 is
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
hi
gh
er
 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
an
d 
la
bo
r 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
.
 
A
lso
 
fin
d 
th
at
 fo
re
ig
n
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
o
w
n
er
s 
an
d 
n
o
n
-b
an
k-
sp
o
n
so
re
d 
in
v
es
tm
en
t f
un
ds
 im
pr
o
v
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 m
o
re
 th
an
 
ba
n
k-
sp
on
so
re
d 
fu
n
ds
.
 
Li
za
l, 
Si
n
ge
r,
 
Sv
ejn
ar
 (2
00
0) 
 
Ex
am
in
es
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 e
ffe
ct
s 
o
f t
he
 w
av
e 
o
f b
re
ak
-u
ps
 
o
f 
Cz
ec
hs
lo
v
ak
 
SO
Es
 
o
n
 
th
e 
su
bs
eq
ue
n
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 m
as
te
r 
fir
m
 
an
d 
th
e 
sp
in
 
o
ffs
.
 
Th
e 
re
gr
es
sio
n
s 
u
se
 d
at
a 
fo
r 
37
3 
fir
m
s 
in
 
19
91
 a
nd
 2
62
 fi
rm
s 
in
 
19
92
. 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 
an
 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 (i
n 1
99
1) 
po
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
o
f s
m
al
l a
nd
 
m
ed
iu
m
 
siz
e 
fir
m
s 
(bo
th
 
m
as
te
r 
an
d 
sp
in
-
o
ffs
) a
nd
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
la
rg
er
 fi
rm
s.
 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 
fo
r 
19
92
 ar
e 
sim
ila
r 
bu
t n
o
t s
ta
tis
tic
al
ly
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t. 
 
 
 
 
 H
ar
pe
r (
20
01
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
o
n
 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 1
74
 fi
rm
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 in
 
th
e 
fir
st
—
an
d 
38
0 
fir
m
s 
di
ve
st
ed
 in
 
th
e 
se
co
n
d—
w
av
e 
o
f t
he
 C
ze
ch
 
R
ep
ub
lic
’s
 
v
o
u
ch
er
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
s 
o
f 1
99
2 
an
d 
19
94
. C
o
m
pa
re
s 
re
su
lts
 
fo
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
fir
m
s 
to
 
th
o
se
 w
hi
ch
 
re
m
ai
n
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
.
 
Em
pl
o
ys
 
M
eg
gi
n
so
n
,
 
N
as
h 
an
d 
va
n
 
R
an
de
n
bo
rg
h 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
an
d 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
to
 m
ea
su
re
 c
ha
n
ge
s.
 
Fi
n
ds
 
th
at
 
th
e 
fir
st
 
w
av
e 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
yi
el
ds
 
di
sa
pp
oi
n
tin
g 
re
su
lts
.
 
R
ea
l s
al
es
, 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
,
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
an
d 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t a
ll 
de
cl
in
ed
 
dr
am
at
ic
al
ly
 
(an
d 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
). H
o
w
ev
er
,
 
se
co
n
d 
w
av
e 
fir
m
s 
ex
pe
rie
n
ce
 s
ig
n
ifi
ca
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
an
d 
th
e 
de
cl
in
e 
in
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t—
th
o
u
gh
 
st
ill
 si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t—
is 
m
u
ch
 
le
ss
 d
ra
st
ic
 
th
an
 
af
te
r 
fir
st
 
w
av
e 
(-1
7%
 
v
s 
-
41
%
).  
 
Li
za
l a
n
d 
Sv
ejn
ar
 (2
00
1) 
Ex
am
in
e 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
an
d 
n
ew
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
o
f 4
,0
00
 C
ze
ch
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s d
ur
in
g 
19
92
-1
99
8.
 D
at
as
et
 in
cl
ud
es
 
o
v
er
 8
3,
00
0 
qu
ar
te
rly
 
o
bs
er
v
at
io
n
s.
 
D
ev
el
o
p 
an
d 
te
st
 
a 
dy
n
am
ic
 
m
o
de
l o
f r
es
tr
u
ct
u
rin
g 
an
d 
in
v
es
tm
en
t, 
al
lo
w
in
g 
th
em
 
to
 
ex
am
in
e 
se
pa
ra
bl
e 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f p
riv
at
e 
v
er
su
s 
pu
bl
ic
 
an
d 
do
m
es
tic
 
v
er
su
s 
fo
re
ig
n
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
o
n
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g,
 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 
o
f 
ac
ce
ss
 
to
 c
re
di
t a
nd
 a
 so
ft 
bu
dg
et
 c
on
st
ra
in
t o
n
 
fir
m
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
(1)
 
 
fo
re
ig
n 
ow
n
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
in
v
es
t t
he
 
m
o
st
 
an
d 
(do
me
st
ic
al
ly
 
o
w
n
ed
) c
oo
pe
rat
iv
es
 
th
e 
le
as
t; 
(2)
 pr
iva
te
 fi
rm
s 
do
 n
o
t 
in
v
es
t m
o
re
 th
an
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 fi
rm
s;
 
(30
 co
op
era
tiv
es
 
an
d 
sm
al
l f
irm
s 
ar
e 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tio
ne
d;
 a
nd
 (4
) S
OE
s o
pe
ra
te
 u
n
de
r 
a 
so
ft 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
t  
Fi
dr
m
u
c 
an
d 
Fi
dr
m
u
c 
(20
01
) 
U
se
 a
 s
am
pl
e 
of
 
17
8 
Cz
ec
h 
fir
m
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
fir
st
 w
av
e 
o
f 
v
o
u
ch
er
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
(19
92
-19
94
) t
o
 
te
st
 
w
he
th
er
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
ch
an
ge
 
pr
o
m
o
te
d 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
an
d 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
.
 
U
se
 M
N
R 
pr
e 
ve
rs
u
s 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
co
m
pa
ris
o
n
 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 
to
 te
st
 
fo
r 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 c
ha
n
ge
s 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
an
d 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
de
cl
in
ed
 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
an
d 
th
at
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
fir
m
s’
 o
pe
ra
tio
n
s 
do
 
n
o
t v
ar
y 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
by
 
siz
e 
o
r 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
—
bu
t d
o 
va
ry
 
by
 
in
du
st
ry
 
ty
pe
, w
ith
 
n
o
n
-m
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
ex
pe
rie
n
ci
n
g 
m
o
re
 p
os
iti
v
e 
(or
 le
ss
 
n
eg
at
iv
e) 
ch
an
ge
s.
 
 
Li
za
l a
n
d 
Sv
ejn
ar
 (2
00
2) 
U
se
 p
an
el
 
o
f o
v
er
 8
3,
50
0 
qu
ar
te
rly
 
o
bs
er
v
at
io
n
s 
fro
m
 
4,
00
0 
m
ed
iu
m
 
an
d 
la
rg
e 
Cz
ec
h 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
o
v
er
 th
e 
19
92
-1
99
8 
pe
rio
d 
to
 
as
se
ss
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f m
as
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
o
n
 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
fo
re
ig
n
 
o
w
n
er
s 
u
n
am
bi
gu
o
u
sly
 
im
pr
ov
e 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (m
ea
su
re
d 
se
v
er
al
 
w
ay
s,
 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
pr
of
its
 
an
d 
in
v
es
tm
en
t) 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s, 
bu
t d
o
m
es
tic
 o
w
n
er
s 
do
 
n
o
t. 
 
K
oc
en
da
 a
nd
 
Sv
ejn
ar
 (2
00
2) 
A
n
al
yz
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 o
n 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
u
sin
g 
a 
da
ta
se
t o
f 2
,5
29
-2
,9
49
 
o
bs
er
v
at
io
n
s 
o
n
 
an
 
u
n
ba
la
n
ce
d 
pa
ne
l o
f 1
,3
71
-1
,5
40
 m
ed
iu
m
 
an
d 
la
rg
e 
Cz
ec
h 
fir
m
s.
 
de
fin
e 
six
 
ca
te
go
rie
s o
f o
w
n
er
s 
an
d 
ex
am
in
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f e
ac
h.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 c
on
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 fo
re
ig
n 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
 im
pr
ov
es
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
bu
t d
om
es
tic
 
pr
iv
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 d
oe
s n
o
t, 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 
st
at
e 
fir
m
s.
 
Fo
re
ig
n
-
o
w
n
ed
 
fir
m
s 
en
ga
ge
 
in
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
by
 
in
cr
ea
sin
g 
sa
le
s a
n
d 
pr
o
fit
s, 
w
hi
le
 d
o
m
es
tic
 fi
rm
s 
re
du
ce
 s
al
es
 a
n
d 
la
bo
r c
os
ts
 
w
ith
o
u
t i
n
cr
ea
sin
g 
pr
of
its
.
 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 c
on
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 
ge
n
er
al
ly
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
im
pr
o
v
ed
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 c
on
cl
ud
e 
th
at
 s
ta
te
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 p
la
ys
 
a 
m
u
ch
 
m
o
re
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
al
ly
 
an
d 
so
ci
al
ly
 
be
n
ef
ic
ia
l r
o
le
 in
 
th
is 
tr
an
sit
io
n
 
ec
o
n
o
m
y 
th
an
 
th
eo
ry
 
w
o
u
ld
 
pr
ed
ic
t. 
Cu
ll,
 
M
at
es
o
v
a 
an
d 
Sh
irl
ey
 
(20
02
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
in
ce
n
tiv
e 
o
f m
an
ag
er
s 
o
f v
o
u
ch
er
-p
riv
at
iz
ed
 C
ze
ch
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s t
o 
“
tu
n
n
el
” 
(st
rip
 
as
se
ts
 o
u
t o
f c
o
m
pa
n
ie
s a
t t
he
 
ex
pe
ns
e 
o
f o
u
ts
id
e 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s) 
an
d 
“l
o
o
t”
 th
ei
r c
om
pa
n
ie
s. 
Lo
o
tin
g 
o
cc
u
rs
 
w
he
n
 
fir
m
s 
fa
ce
 
a 
so
ft 
bu
dg
et
 c
on
st
ra
in
t a
n
d 
Co
n
tr
o
lli
n
g 
fo
r 
siz
e,
 in
du
st
ry
,
 
ca
pi
ta
l i
nt
en
sit
y 
an
d 
in
iti
al
 le
v
er
ag
e,
 
fin
d 
th
at
 v
o
u
ch
er
-
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 JS
Cs
 
pe
rfo
rm
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
w
o
rs
e 
th
an
 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 th
at
 a
re
 p
ur
ch
as
ed
 fo
r 
ca
sh
.
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
fu
n
d-
co
n
tr
o
lle
d 
JS
Cs
 u
n
de
r-
pe
rfo
rm
 
al
l o
th
er
 
fir
m
s,
 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
ot
he
r 
 m
an
ag
er
s 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 b
or
ro
w
 
he
av
ily
,
 
ex
tr
ac
t f
u
n
ds
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
fir
m
,
 
an
d 
th
en
 
de
fa
u
lt 
o
n
 
th
e 
de
bt
 
w
ith
o
u
t p
en
al
ty
.
 
 
Em
pl
o
y 
a 
da
ta
se
t 
w
ith
 
1,
01
7 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
fro
m
 
39
2 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
sp
re
ad
 n
ea
rly
 
ev
en
ly
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
19
94
-9
6.
 H
al
f o
f t
he
 fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
v
o
u
ch
er
-p
riv
at
iz
ed
 jo
in
t 
st
oc
k 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s (
JS
Cs
) w
hi
le
 h
al
f a
re
 li
m
ite
d 
lia
bi
lit
y 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
(L
LC
s).
 
JS
Cs
. F
un
d-
co
n
tr
o
lle
d 
JS
Cs
 a
lso
 
ta
ke
 
o
n
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
at
 a
 m
u
ch
 
fa
st
er
 
ra
te
 th
an
 
o
th
er
 fi
rm
s,
 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
u
n
de
r 
a 
so
ft 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
t. 
Th
o
u
gh
 
n
o
t a
bl
e 
to
 
m
ea
su
re
 d
ire
ct
ly
,
 
ev
id
en
ce
 in
di
re
ct
ly
 
sh
o
w
s 
th
at
 lo
ot
in
g 
is 
a 
w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
oc
cu
rr
en
ce
 fo
r 
m
an
y 
JS
Cs
.
 
D
yc
k 
(19
97
) 
D
ev
el
o
ps
 
an
d 
te
st
s 
an
 
ad
v
er
se
 s
el
ec
tio
n
 
m
o
de
l t
o
 
ex
pl
ai
n
 
th
e 
Tr
eu
ha
n
d’
s 
ro
le
 
in
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
in
g 
ea
st
er
n
 
G
er
m
an
y’
s 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 
fir
m
s.
 
In
 
le
ss
 th
an
 
fiv
e 
ye
ar
s,
 
th
e 
Tr
eu
ha
n
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 m
o
re
 th
an
 
13
,8
00
 fi
rm
s 
an
d 
pa
rts
 
o
f f
irm
s 
an
d,
 u
n
iq
u
el
y,
 
ha
d 
th
e 
re
so
u
rc
es
 
to
 p
ay
 
fo
r 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
its
el
f—
bu
t a
lm
o
st
 
n
ev
er
 c
ho
se
 to
 d
o 
so
.
 
In
st
ea
d,
 it
 e
m
ph
as
iz
ed
 sp
ee
d 
an
d 
sa
le
s t
o 
ex
ist
in
g 
w
es
te
rn
 
fir
m
s 
o
v
er
 
gi
v
ea
w
ay
s 
an
d 
sa
le
s 
to
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
fu
n
ds
. 
Pa
pe
r 
ra
tio
n
al
iz
es
 
Tr
eu
ha
n
d’
s 
ap
pr
o
ac
h.
 
D
oc
um
en
ts
 
th
at
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 e
as
t G
er
m
an
 
fir
m
s 
ar
e 
m
u
ch
 
m
o
re
 
lik
el
y 
to
 
tr
an
sf
er
 w
es
te
rn
 
(us
u
al
ly
 
G
er
m
an
) m
an
ag
er
s 
in
to
 k
ey
 
po
sit
io
n
s 
th
an
 
ar
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s t
ha
t r
em
ai
n
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
. A
lso
 
fin
ds
 
th
at
 T
re
u
ha
n
d 
em
ph
as
iz
es
 sa
le
s o
pe
n
 
to
 
al
l b
u
ye
rs
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 
fa
v
o
rin
g 
ea
st
er
n
 
G
er
m
an
s.
 P
rin
ci
pa
l m
es
sa
ge
: 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pr
o
gr
am
s 
m
u
st
 c
ar
ef
u
lly
 
co
n
sid
er
 w
he
n
 
an
d 
ho
w
 
to
 a
ffe
ct
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l r
ep
la
ce
m
en
t i
n
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s. 
Pl
an
s 
o
pe
n 
to
 w
es
te
rn
 
bu
ye
rs
,
 
an
d 
w
hi
ch
 
al
lo
w
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
ha
n
ge
,
 
ar
e 
m
o
st
 
lik
el
y 
to
 im
pr
ov
e 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
G
le
n
n
er
st
er
 
(20
03
) 
U
sin
g 
a 
pa
ne
l d
at
as
et
 
o
n
 
47
0 
fo
rm
er
ly
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 fi
rm
s 
in
 
th
e 
fo
rm
er
 Y
u
go
sla
v
 
R
ep
u
bl
ic
 
o
f M
ac
ed
on
ia
 
(F
SR
M
) f
o
r 
19
96
-1
99
9,
 
ex
am
in
es
 
w
he
th
er
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
o
f d
iv
es
te
d 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s. 
U
se
s 
a 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
ct
s 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
to
 a
dd
re
ss
 
se
le
ct
io
n
 
bi
as
 
in
 
bo
th
 
th
e 
tim
in
g 
an
d 
m
et
ho
d 
of
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Fi
nd
s 
w
ea
k 
bu
t s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t e
vi
de
n
ce
 th
at
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
ca
n
 
yi
el
d 
be
ne
fit
s 
ev
en
 
w
ith
 
pr
ed
om
in
an
tly
 
in
sid
er
 sa
le
s 
an
d 
in
 
an
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t 
o
f w
ea
k 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
v
er
n
an
ce
.
 
O
n 
av
er
ag
e,
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
 
30
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
re
v
en
u
es
 
an
d 
co
sts
,
 
a 
16
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
th
e 
n
u
m
be
r o
f 
w
o
rk
er
s 
em
pl
oy
ed
, a
nd
 a
 $1
,20
0 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
pr
of
its
 
pe
r w
o
rk
er
. 
Fi
rm
s 
so
ld
 to
 o
ut
sid
er
s a
n
d 
th
o
se
 w
ith
 
m
o
re
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 e
xp
an
d 
m
o
re
 
th
an
 
o
th
er
,
 
sim
ila
r f
irm
s 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Em
pl
o
ye
e 
bu
y-
o
u
ts
 
pe
rfo
rm
 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
po
or
ly
.
 
A
lso
 fi
n
d 
th
at
 
la
ck
 
o
f a
cc
es
s 
to
 c
ap
ita
l i
s a
n
 
im
po
rta
n
t r
ea
so
n
 
w
hy
 
in
sid
er
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
s 
pe
rfo
rm
 
po
or
ly
,
 
sin
ce
 
th
o
se
 fi
rm
s 
w
he
re
 n
ew
 
o
w
n
er
s 
br
in
g 
in
 
n
ew
 
ca
pi
ta
l s
ee
 p
ar
tic
u
la
rly
 
hi
gh
 
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
s 
af
te
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
.
 
G
ro
sf
el
d 
an
d 
Tr
es
se
l (
20
02
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
an
d 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 a
re
 
su
bs
tit
ut
es
 o
r 
co
m
pl
em
en
ts
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
pr
o
m
o
tin
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 
in
 
Po
la
nd
’
s 
tr
an
sit
io
n
.
 
U
se
 th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
da
ta
 
fo
r 
al
l 2
00
 n
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
fir
m
s 
lis
te
d 
on
 
th
e 
W
ar
sa
w
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 
fro
m
 
19
91
-1
99
8.
 F
irs
t s
tu
dy
 
th
e 
se
pa
ra
te
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f c
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
an
d 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 
o
n
 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
 
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 
le
v
el
, t
he
n
 
ex
am
in
e 
th
ei
r i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 p
ro
du
ct
 m
ar
ke
t c
om
pe
tit
io
n
 
ha
s 
a 
po
sit
iv
e 
an
d 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 c
on
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
,
 
w
hi
ch
 
is 
qu
ite
 h
ig
h 
in
 
Po
la
nd
,
 
tu
rn
s 
o
u
t t
o 
be
 
U
-s
ha
pe
d.
 
Fi
rm
s 
w
ith
 
di
sp
er
se
d 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 a
nd
 th
o
se
 w
he
re
 o
n
e 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
 o
w
n
s 
m
o
re
 th
an
 
50
%
 
o
f 
v
o
tin
g 
sh
ar
es
 
ha
v
e 
hi
gh
er
 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
 
th
an
 
th
o
se
 
w
ith
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 le
ve
ls 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
.
 
Co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
pr
es
su
re
 
do
es
 
n
o
t a
ffe
ct
 
n
ew
ly
 
cr
ea
te
d 
fir
m
s,
 
bu
t d
oe
s s
ig
n
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
im
pr
ov
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f p
riv
at
iz
ed
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s.
 
Pr
es
en
ce
 o
f a
 la
rg
e 
fo
re
ig
n
 
o
w
n
er
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
.
 
Co
n
cl
u
de
 
th
at
 
go
o
d 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 a
n
d 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
pr
es
su
re
s 
ar
e 
co
m
pl
em
en
ts
. 
 Co
ric
el
li 
an
d 
D
jan
ko
v
 
(20
01
) 
Id
en
tif
y 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f s
o
ft 
bu
dg
et
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts 
an
d 
an
al
yz
e 
th
ei
r 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
in
 
R
o
m
an
ia
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
in
iti
al
 
tr
an
sit
io
n
 
pe
rio
d.
 
Em
pl
o
y 
a 
sim
pl
e 
an
al
yt
ic
al
 m
o
de
l a
nd
 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 4
,4
29
 e
nt
er
pr
ise
s 
w
ith
 
da
ta
 
fro
m
 
19
92
-1
99
5 
to
 
te
st
 
w
he
th
er
 
ha
rd
en
in
g 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
 p
ro
m
o
te
s 
be
n
ef
ic
ia
l r
es
tr
u
ct
u
rin
g 
an
d 
ne
w
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t o
r 
w
he
th
er
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 e
xt
er
na
l f
in
an
ci
n
g 
is 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
pr
o
m
o
te
 n
ew
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t. 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
ha
rd
 b
ud
ge
t c
o
n
st
ra
in
ts
 
(H
B
Cs
) d
o p
rom
o
te
 p
as
siv
e 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g,
 
in
 
th
e 
fo
rm
 
o
f l
ab
o
r 
sh
ed
di
n
g,
 
bu
t n
o
t n
ew
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t. 
A
ct
iv
e 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
re
qu
ire
s 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
fin
an
ci
n
g.
 
Ti
gh
te
n
ed
 
ba
nk
 
cr
ed
it 
ca
n 
in
du
ce
 H
B
Cs
 
an
d 
ra
ise
 e
n
te
rp
ris
e 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
in
 
th
e 
sh
o
rt
-r
u
n
,
 
bu
t a
t t
he
 c
o
st
 o
f c
u
rt
ai
lin
g 
in
v
es
tm
en
t. 
Ea
rle
 a
nd
 
Te
le
gd
y 
(20
02
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
—
an
d 
m
et
ho
d 
of
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
—
o
n
 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 in
 
R
o
m
an
ia
 o
v
er
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
92
-1
99
9.
 
Em
pl
o
y 
a 
da
ta
se
t o
f 2
,3
54
 fi
rm
s 
o
w
n
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
St
at
e 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
Fu
n
d 
(S
O
F)
 in
 
19
92
, a
nd
 tr
ac
e 
ev
o
lu
tio
n
 
o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 o
ve
r 
n
ex
t 
six
 
ye
ar
s;
 m
o
st
 o
f t
he
se
 (7
7%
) s
til
l h
av
e 
so
m
e 
st
at
e 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
 
(50
.9%
 
m
ed
ia
n
) i
n
 
19
98
. 
 
Sh
o
w
 
co
n
sis
te
n
tly
 
po
sit
iv
e,
 h
ig
hl
y 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t e
ffe
ct
s 
o
f p
riv
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 o
n 
la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
gr
o
w
th
,
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
po
in
t e
st
im
at
e 
im
pl
yi
n
g 
an
 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l 1
.0
 to
 
1.
7 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
po
in
t g
ro
w
th
 
in
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
fo
r 
a 
10
%
 
ris
e 
in
 
pr
iv
at
e 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
in
g.
 
In
sid
er
 tr
an
sf
er
s 
an
d 
m
as
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
s 
ha
v
e 
sm
al
le
r, 
bu
t s
til
l s
ig
n
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
po
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s.
 
Sm
ith
, C
in
 a
n
d 
V
o
do
pi
v
ec
 
(19
97
) 
U
sin
g 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
w
ith
 
22
,7
35
 fi
rm
-
ye
ar
s 
o
f d
at
a 
dr
aw
n
 
fro
m
 
pe
rio
d 
o
f “
sp
on
ta
n
eo
u
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
”
 
in
 
Sl
o
v
en
ia
 
(19
89
-19
92
), e
x
am
in
e 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f f
o
re
ig
n
 
an
d 
em
pl
o
ye
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 o
n 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 a
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
t i
n
cr
ea
se
 in
 
fo
re
ig
n
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 is
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
a 
3.
9%
 in
cr
ea
se
 
in
 
v
al
u
e-
ad
de
d,
 a
nd
 fo
r 
em
pl
o
ye
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
w
ith
 
a 
1.
4%
 
in
cr
ea
se
.
 
A
lso
 
fin
d 
th
at
 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 
hi
gh
er
 
re
v
en
u
es
,
 
pr
of
its
,
 
an
d 
ex
po
rts
 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 
ex
hi
bi
t f
o
re
ig
n
 
an
d 
em
pl
o
ye
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
.
 
 
 
 Ta
bl
e 
5.
 
Su
m
m
a
ry
 
o
f  
Em
pi
ri
ca
l S
tu
di
es
 o
f P
ri
va
tiz
at
io
n
 in
 
R
us
sia
 
a
n
d 
Fo
rm
er
 S
ov
ie
t R
ep
ub
lic
s 
St
u
dy
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
,
 
st
u
dy
 
pe
rio
d,
 a
nd
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
o
f e
m
pi
ric
al
 
fin
di
n
gs
 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
sio
n
s 
D
jan
ko
v
 
(19
99
a) 
In
v
es
tig
at
es
 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
an
d 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
fo
r 
96
0 
fir
m
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
in
 
six
 n
ew
ly
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t s
ta
te
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
19
95
 an
d 
19
97
. E
m
pl
o
y 
su
rv
ey
 
da
ta
 
co
lle
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
W
or
ld
 B
an
k 
in
 
la
te
 
19
97
 fr
o
m
 
G
eo
rg
ia
,
 
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
,
 
K
yr
gy
z 
R
ep
ub
lic
, M
ol
do
va
, 
R
u
ss
ia
 a
nd
 U
kr
ai
ne
.
 
Sh
o
w
 
th
at
 fo
re
ig
n
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
is 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
at
 
hi
gh
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
le
v
el
s 
(>
30
%
), 
w
hi
le
 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
is 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g 
at
 lo
w
 
(<
10
%
) o
r 
hi
gh
 
le
ve
ls,
 b
u
t n
eg
at
iv
e 
at
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 le
ve
ls.
 
Em
pl
o
ye
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
is 
be
n
ef
ic
ia
l t
o 
la
bo
r 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
at
 
lo
w
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
le
v
el
s, 
bu
t i
s 
o
th
er
w
ise
 in
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
. 
D
jan
ko
v
 
(19
99
b) 
U
sin
g 
sa
m
e 
su
rv
ey
 
da
ta
 
as
 
in
 
D
jan
ko
v
 
(19
99
a) 
ab
o
v
e,
 s
tu
di
es
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f d
iff
er
en
t p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
m
o
da
lit
ie
s 
o
n
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
pr
oc
es
s 
in
 
G
eo
rg
ia
 (9
2 f
irm
s) 
an
d 
M
ol
do
va
 (1
49
 fi
rm
s).
 
G
eo
rg
ia
 e
m
pl
o
ys
 v
o
u
ch
er
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
w
hi
le
 th
e 
m
ajo
rit
y 
o
f 
M
ol
do
va
n
 
fir
m
s 
ar
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
by
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t f
un
ds
—
an
d 
n
u
m
er
o
u
s 
o
th
er
s 
ar
e 
so
ld
 
to
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
fo
r 
ca
sh
.  
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t b
u
y-
o
u
ts
 is
 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g,
 
w
hi
le
 
v
o
u
ch
er
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
do
 n
ot
 
re
st
ru
ct
u
re
 m
o
re
 
ra
pi
dl
y 
th
an
 
fir
m
s 
th
at
 
re
m
ai
n
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
. I
m
pl
ie
s 
th
at
 
m
an
ag
er
s 
w
ho
 g
ai
n
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 fo
r 
fre
e 
m
ay
 
ha
v
e 
le
ss
 
in
ce
n
tiv
e 
to
 re
st
ru
ct
u
re
, 
as
 
th
ei
r i
nc
o
m
e 
is 
n
o
t 
so
le
ly
 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
th
e 
su
cc
es
s 
o
f t
he
 
en
te
rp
ris
e.
 
Ea
rle
 (1
99
8) 
In
v
es
tig
at
es
 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
o
n
 
th
e 
(la
bo
r) 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
o
f R
us
sia
n
 
in
du
str
ia
l f
irm
s.
 
U
sin
g 
19
94
 su
rv
ey
 
da
ta
, e
xa
m
in
es
 d
iff
er
en
tia
l i
m
pa
ct
 o
f i
ns
id
er
,
 
o
u
ts
id
er
,
 
an
d 
st
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 o
n 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 4
30
 fi
rm
s-
-o
f w
hi
ch
 
86
 re
m
ai
n
 
10
0%
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
, 2
99
 a
re
 
pa
rti
al
ly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
, 
an
d 
45
 ar
e n
ew
ly
-
cr
ea
te
d.
 A
dju
st
s 
em
pi
ric
al
 m
et
ho
ds
 
to
 
ac
co
u
n
t f
o
r 
te
nd
en
cy
 
o
f i
n
sid
er
s 
to
 c
la
im
 
do
m
in
an
t o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
in
 
th
e 
be
st 
fir
m
s 
be
in
g 
di
v
es
te
d.
 
O
LS
 re
gr
es
sio
n
s 
sh
o
w
 
a 
po
sit
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f p
riv
at
e 
(re
lat
ive
 to
 
st
at
e) 
sh
ar
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 o
n 
la
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
,
 
w
ith
 
th
is 
re
su
lt 
pr
im
ar
ily
 
du
e 
to
 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
.
 
A
fte
r 
ad
jus
tin
g 
fo
r 
se
le
ct
io
n
 
bi
as
, 
ho
w
ev
er
,
 
fin
ds
 
th
at
 o
n
ly
 
o
u
ts
id
er
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
is 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
. S
tr
es
se
s 
th
at
 le
av
in
g 
in
sid
er
s 
in
 
co
n
tr
o
l o
f f
irm
s—
w
hi
le
 p
o
lit
ic
al
ly
 
ex
pe
di
en
t—
ha
s 
v
er
y 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 im
pl
ic
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
of
 
R
u
ss
ia
n
 in
du
st
ry
.
 
Ea
rle
 a
nd
 
Es
tri
n 
(19
98
) 
U
sin
g 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
ve
ry
 
sim
ila
r t
o 
th
at
 u
se
d 
by
 
Ea
rle
 (1
99
8) 
ab
o
v
e,
 e
x
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
an
d 
th
e 
ha
rd
en
in
g 
o
f b
u
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
 
pl
ay
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
-
en
ha
n
ci
n
g 
ro
le
s i
n 
R
u
ss
ia
.  
Fi
nd
 
a 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 
pr
iv
at
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 ra
ise
s 
re
al
 sa
le
s 
pe
r e
m
pl
oy
ee
 b
y 
3-
5%
. S
ub
sid
ie
s (
so
ft 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
) r
ed
uc
e 
th
e 
pa
ce
 o
f 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
in
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 fi
rm
s,
 
bu
t t
he
 e
ffe
ct
 is
 
sm
al
l a
n
d 
of
te
n 
in
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
. 
Jo
ne
s 
an
d 
M
yg
in
d 
(20
02
) 
U
se
s 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
ct
s 
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 
m
o
de
ls 
es
tim
at
ed
 o
n 
a 
ra
n
do
m
 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 6
60
 E
sto
n
ia
n
 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 
da
ta
 
fro
m
 
19
93
 to
 
19
97
. P
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
in
 
Es
to
n
ia
 c
re
at
ed
 a
 w
id
el
y 
v
ar
ie
d 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
u
re
s,
 
an
d 
stu
dy
 
at
te
m
pt
s 
to
 e
st
im
at
e 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
be
tw
ee
n
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
an
d 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
e 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
.
 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
,
 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 
st
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
, (1
) p
riv
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 is
 
13
-2
2%
 
m
o
re
 
ef
fic
ie
n
t, 
(2)
 al
l t
yp
es
 
o
f p
riv
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 a
re
 m
o
re
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
e,
 th
o
u
gh
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 h
as
 
th
e 
bi
gg
es
t e
ffe
ct
 (2
1-
32
%
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t),
 
an
d 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
 b
y 
do
m
es
tic
 
o
u
ts
id
er
s 
th
e 
sm
al
le
st
 
(0-
15
%
), 
w
ith
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 b
y 
fo
re
ig
n
er
s 
(21
-32
%
) a
nd
 e
m
pl
o
ye
es
 
(24
-25
%
) y
ie
ld
in
g 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 le
ve
ls 
o
f i
m
pr
o
v
em
en
t. 
D
jan
ko
v
 
an
d 
N
en
o
v
a 
U
se
 d
at
a 
fo
r 
o
v
er
 6
,6
00
 
K
az
ak
h 
en
te
rp
ris
es
 
du
rin
g 
19
96
-9
9 
to
 
ex
am
in
e 
“
w
hy
 
di
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
fa
il 
in
 
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
?”
 
Tr
yi
n
g 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
n
ew
ly
 
cr
ea
te
d 
(de
 no
v
o
) p
riv
at
e 
en
te
rp
ris
es
,
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 a
fte
r 
19
92
, 
pe
rfo
rm
 
m
ar
ke
dl
y 
be
tte
r 
th
an
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
o
r 
th
o
se
 th
at
 
re
m
ai
n
 
SO
Es
.
 
 (20
00
) 
to
 
ex
pl
ai
n
 
ra
pi
d 
de
cl
in
es
 
in
 
o
u
tp
ut
 
fo
r 
al
l s
ec
to
rs
 
ex
ce
pt
 
o
il 
an
d 
ga
s.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
fir
m
s 
pe
rfo
rm
 
as
 b
ad
ly
 
as
,
 
o
r 
w
o
rs
e 
th
an
,
 
SO
Es
.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
fa
ils
 to
 
im
pr
ov
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 b
ec
au
se
 
di
ve
st
ed
 fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
u
se
d 
as
 
sh
o
rt
-t
er
m
 
v
eh
ic
le
s f
o
r 
ex
tr
ac
tin
g 
pr
iv
at
e 
be
n
ef
its
.
 
G
re
go
ria
n 
(20
00
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
be
tw
ee
n
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
an
d 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 u
sin
g 
a 
da
ta
se
t o
f 5
,3
00
 sm
al
l, 
m
ed
iu
m
 
an
d 
la
rg
e 
Li
th
u
an
ia
n
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
w
ith
 
da
ta
 
o
v
er
 p
er
io
d 
19
95
-1
99
7.
 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s i
n
cr
ea
se
d 
re
ve
n
u
es
 
an
d 
im
pr
ov
ed
 
ex
po
rt 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
A
lso
 
u
se
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
an
al
ys
is 
to
 s
tu
dy
 
su
bs
am
pl
e 
o
f 6
18
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s 
w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
fu
lly
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 in
 
19
95
; r
o
u
gh
ly
 h
al
f o
f t
he
se
 
ar
e 
pa
rt
ia
lly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
o
v
er
 
n
ex
t 
tw
o
 y
ea
rs
.
 
Co
n
cl
u
de
 
th
at
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 h
as
 b
ro
u
gh
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 
o
v
er
al
l. 
A
lso
 
fin
d 
a 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
bi
as
 in
 
se
le
ct
in
g 
fir
m
s 
fo
r 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
; o
n
ce
 th
is 
ac
co
u
n
te
d 
fo
r,
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 im
pr
ov
em
en
t i
s 
ev
en
 
m
o
re
 d
ra
m
at
ic
 (t
he
re
 is
 
a 
n
in
e-
fo
ld
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
th
e 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 o
n 
pr
iv
at
e 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
). E
xp
ec
te
d 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
co
n
tr
ib
u
te
 
n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
to
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
,
 
bu
t s
tu
dy
 
fin
ds
 n
o
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t i
m
pa
ct
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
m
ar
ke
t c
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
.
 
A
n
de
rs
o
n
,
 
Le
e 
an
d 
M
ur
re
ll 
(20
00
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f c
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
an
d 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
o
n
 
th
e 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
o
f n
ew
ly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 fi
rm
s 
u
sin
g 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
21
1 
M
o
n
go
lia
n
 c
o
m
pa
n
ie
s 
w
ith
 
(su
rv
ey
-d
er
iv
ed
) o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
da
ta
 
in
 
19
95
. M
on
go
lia
’
s 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
pr
og
ra
m
 
is 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y 
la
ck
in
g 
th
e 
ba
sic
 in
st
itu
tio
n
s 
o
f c
ap
ita
lis
m
.
 
Fi
nd
s 
th
at
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n
 
ha
s 
qu
al
ita
tiv
el
y 
la
rg
e 
ef
fe
ct
s;
 p
er
fe
ct
ly
 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
fir
m
s 
ha
v
e 
n
ea
rly
 
do
ub
le
 th
e 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
o
f m
o
n
o
po
lie
s. 
En
te
rp
ris
es
 
w
ith
 
re
sid
ua
l s
ta
te
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 a
pp
ea
r t
o 
be
 m
o
re
 e
ffi
ci
en
t t
ha
n
 
o
th
er
 e
nt
er
pr
ise
s,
 
re
fle
ct
in
g 
an
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t w
he
re
 th
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t i
s 
pr
es
su
re
d 
to
 fo
cu
s 
o
n
 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
in
st
itu
tio
n
s 
ga
v
e 
lit
tle
 v
o
ic
e 
to
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
o
w
n
er
s.
 
Es
tri
n 
an
d 
R
o
se
v
ea
r 
(19
99
) 
U
se
 a
 r
an
do
m
 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 1
50
 U
kr
ai
n
ia
n
 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 
da
ta
 
fro
m
 
19
96
 to
 
te
st
 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
an
d 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
. E
xp
lo
re
 w
he
th
er
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
yi
el
ds
 
im
pr
ov
ed
 c
om
pa
n
y 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
n
d 
w
he
th
er
 s
pe
ci
fic
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 fo
rm
s 
le
ad
 to
 d
iff
er
en
tia
te
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
le
ve
l. 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
pe
r s
e,
 
is 
n
o
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
im
pr
ov
ed
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
an
d 
fin
d 
n
o
 
be
ne
fit
 
to
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
(ve
rs
u
s 
in
sid
er
) o
wn
er
sh
ip
. D
o
 
fin
d 
cl
ea
r p
o
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 
in
sid
er
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
.
 
O
ut
sid
e 
o
w
n
er
s 
ar
e 
n
ev
er
 a
bl
e 
to
 
de
liv
er
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 s
u
pe
rio
r 
to
 
SO
Es
,
 
an
d 
in
sid
er
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
  
do
es
 
n
o
t y
ie
ld
 a
 b
et
te
r 
pr
of
it 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 th
an
 
in
 
n
o
n
-p
riv
at
iz
ed
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s.
 
A
n
dr
ey
ev
a 
(20
01
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
em
pi
ric
al
ly
 
th
e 
re
sp
on
siv
en
es
s 
o
f f
irm
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
to
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 a
nd
 m
ar
ke
t s
tr
u
ct
u
re
s,
 
se
ct
or
 a
nd
 re
gi
o
n
al
 
sp
ec
ifi
ci
ty
,
 
an
d 
v
ar
yi
n
g 
de
gr
ee
s 
o
f s
o
ft 
bu
dg
et
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
.
 
U
se
 a
 p
an
el
 
o
f 5
24
 m
ed
iu
m
 
an
d 
la
rg
e 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
da
ta
 
fo
r 
19
96
-9
8.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 fi
rm
 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
im
pr
o
v
es
 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 
w
ith
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n.
 
A
lso
 
do
cu
m
en
t a
 s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t i
n
flu
en
ce
 o
f i
nd
u
st
ry
 
af
fil
ia
tio
n
 
an
d 
re
gi
o
n
al
 lo
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
sh
ap
in
g 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
; m
o
re
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 m
ar
ke
ts
 
pe
rfo
rm
 
be
tte
r. 
Co
n
cl
u
de
s 
th
at
 
a 
po
lic
y 
o
f a
ttr
ac
tin
g 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
in
v
es
to
rs
 c
ap
ab
le
 o
f p
u
sh
in
g 
re
st
ru
ct
u
rin
g 
an
d 
br
in
gi
n
g 
n
ew
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t t
o
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
fir
m
s 
sh
ou
ld
 
be
co
m
e 
a 
pr
io
rit
y 
fo
r 
po
lic
y-
m
ak
er
s.
 
Pi
v
o
v
ar
sk
y 
(20
01
) 
U
sin
g 
da
ta
 
o
n
 
37
6 
m
ed
iu
m
 
an
d 
la
rg
e 
U
kr
ai
n
ia
n
 
fir
m
s,
 
in
v
es
tig
at
e 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
be
tw
ee
n
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 a
n
d 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 is
 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
an
d 
th
at
 c
on
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 b
y 
fo
re
ig
n
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
an
d 
ba
nk
s 
is 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
be
tte
r p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 th
an
 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 d
om
es
tic
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
. 
Co
n
cl
u
de
s t
ha
t p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
ha
s 
la
st
in
g 
im
pa
ct
 
o
n
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
u
re
; 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
m
et
ho
ds
 
th
at
 g
ra
n
t s
ig
n
ifi
ca
nt
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
st
ak
es
 
to
 
sin
gl
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
ha
v
e 
gr
ea
te
r e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
ga
in
s 
th
an
 
m
et
ho
ds
 
th
at
 c
re
at
e 
di
sp
er
se
d 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
.  
Ta
bl
e 
5.
 S
um
m
a
ry
 o
f R
ec
en
t E
m
pi
ri
ca
l S
tu
di
es
 
Ex
a
m
in
in
g 
W
he
th
er
 th
e 
Im
po
sit
io
n 
of
 
H
ar
d 
Bu
dg
et
 C
on
st
ra
in
ts
 
(H
BC
) a
nd
 Im
pr
ov
ed
 In
ce
n
tiv
es
 
fo
r 
M
a
n
a
ge
rs
 
Im
pr
ov
es
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
 
St
u
dy
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n
, 
st
u
dy
 
pe
ri
od
, 
a
n
d 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Su
m
m
a
ry
 
o
f e
m
pi
ri
ca
l f
in
di
n
gs
 a
n
d 
co
n
cl
us
io
n
s 
G
ro
v
es
,
 
H
o
n
g,
 
M
cM
ill
an
 
an
d 
N
au
gh
to
n
 
(19
94
) 
U
sin
g 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f d
at
a 
fo
r 
76
9 
Ch
in
es
e 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 e
nt
er
pr
ise
s 
o
v
er
 th
e 
ye
ar
s 
19
80
-8
9,
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f d
ev
el
o
pi
n
g 
a 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l l
ab
or
 m
ar
ke
t o
n
 
fir
m
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
n
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
.  
Fi
n
d 
th
at
 
n
ew
 
po
sit
iv
e 
an
d 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
in
ce
n
tiv
es
 
w
er
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
in
 
pr
om
o
tin
g 
im
pr
ov
ed
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, 
an
d 
th
at
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
o
n
tr
ac
ts
 
w
er
e 
w
id
el
y 
ad
op
te
d 
as
 
pa
rt 
o
f r
ef
o
rm
 
pr
oc
es
s.
 
Po
or
ly
 
pe
rfo
rm
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
s 
w
er
e 
m
o
re
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 
be
 re
pl
ac
ed
, a
nd
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l p
ay
 
w
as
 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
fir
m
 
sa
le
s 
an
d 
pr
of
its
.
 
O
u
tp
u
t p
er
 w
o
rk
er
 r
o
se
 
67
 p
er
ce
nt
 
in
 
re
al
 
te
rm
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
19
80
 a
nd
 1
98
9 
fo
r 
sa
m
pl
e 
fir
m
s.
 
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
im
pr
o
v
es
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 w
ith
o
u
t o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 c
ha
n
ge
s.
 
Fr
yd
m
an
,
 
G
ra
y,
 
H
es
se
l a
n
d 
Ra
pa
cz
yn
sk
i 
(20
00
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
im
po
sit
io
n
 
o
f h
ar
d 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
 
is 
al
on
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t t
o 
im
pr
ov
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 in
 
th
e 
Cz
ec
h 
R
ep
ub
lic
,
 
H
u
n
ga
ry
 
an
d 
Po
la
n
d.
 
Em
pl
o
ys
 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 2
16
 fi
rm
s,
 
sp
lit
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
st
at
e-
o
w
n
ed
 
(31
%
), p
riv
at
iz
ed
 
(43
%
), a
n
d 
pr
iv
at
e 
(26
%)
 fi
rm
s.
 
Fi
n
d 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
al
o
n
e 
ad
de
d 
ne
ar
ly
 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
 
to
 
th
e 
re
v
en
u
e 
gr
o
w
th
 
o
f a
 fi
rm
 
so
ld
 
to
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
o
w
n
er
s.
 
M
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t, 
fin
ds
 
th
at
 th
e 
th
re
at
 
o
f h
ar
d 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
 
fo
r 
po
or
ly
 
pe
rfo
rm
in
g 
SO
Es
 fa
lte
rs
,
 
sin
ce
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
ts
 a
re
 
u
n
w
ill
in
g 
to
 
al
lo
w
 
th
es
e 
fir
m
s 
to
 
fa
il.
 
Th
e 
br
u
n
t o
f 
SO
Es
’
 
lo
w
er
 
cr
ed
itw
o
rt
hi
n
es
s 
fa
lls
 o
n
 
st
at
e 
cr
ed
ito
rs
.
 
Pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
im
pr
ov
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
; t
hr
ea
t o
f H
B
C 
no
t c
re
di
bl
e.
 
B
er
te
ro
 a
nd
 
R
o
n
di
 
(20
00
) 
Em
pl
o
yi
n
g 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
o
f 1
50
 It
al
ia
n
 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
SO
Es
,
 
w
ith
 
1,
27
8 
fir
m
-
ye
ar
 o
bs
er
v
at
io
n
s,
 
ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 im
po
sit
io
n
 
o
f a
 
ha
rd
 b
ud
ge
t c
o
n
st
ra
in
t c
an
 
im
pr
ov
e 
SO
E 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
Ex
pl
o
its
 
th
e 
fa
ct
 
th
at
 fi
sc
al
 e
nv
iro
n
m
en
t b
ec
am
e 
m
u
ch
 
tig
ht
er
 fo
r 
Ita
lia
n
 
st
at
e 
en
te
rp
ris
es
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
la
te
 
19
80
s. 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 th
e 
SO
E 
fir
m
s’
 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
de
bt
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
ha
rd
 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
t p
er
io
d,
 1
98
8-
93
, w
as
 
co
n
sis
te
n
t w
ith
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
pr
es
su
re
, 
bu
t w
as
 
n
o
t d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
so
ft 
bu
dg
et
 
co
n
st
ra
in
t p
er
io
d 
of
 
19
77
-
87
. O
n
ly
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
la
te
r 
pe
rio
d 
do
 fi
rm
s 
re
sp
on
d 
to
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
pr
es
su
re
 b
y 
in
cr
ea
sin
g 
TF
P 
an
d 
re
du
ci
ng
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t. 
Im
po
sit
io
n
 
o
f H
B
C 
im
pr
o
v
es
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 w
ith
o
u
t o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 c
ha
n
ge
.
 
 Ta
bl
e 
6.
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 o
f E
m
pi
ri
ca
l S
tu
di
es
 
o
f P
ri
v
a
tiz
a
tio
n
 
in
 
C
hi
n
a
 
St
u
dy
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
,
 
st
u
dy
 
pe
rio
d,
 a
nd
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
o
f e
m
pi
ric
al
 
fin
di
n
gs
 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
sio
n
s 
Su
n
 a
n
d 
To
n
g 
(20
03
) 
Ev
al
u
at
es
 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 6
34
 C
hi
n
es
e 
SO
Es
 
lis
te
d 
o
n
 
st
o
ck
 
ex
ch
an
ge
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
94
-1
99
8.
 
U
se
 
bo
th
 
M
N
R
 
pr
e-
 
v
s.
 
po
st-
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
co
m
pa
ris
o
n
s 
an
d 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
 
m
et
ho
ds
 to
 
ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 
pa
rti
al
 
di
v
es
tm
en
t i
m
pr
ov
es
 
fir
m
’
s 
ea
rn
in
gs
,
 
o
u
tp
ut
,
 
an
d 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
(re
al 
ou
tp
ut
 
pe
r e
m
pl
o
ye
e).
 A
lso
 
ex
am
in
e 
di
ffe
re
n
tia
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f s
ta
te
 a
nd
 “
le
ga
l p
er
so
n
”
 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
in
gs
.
 
U
sin
g 
M
N
R
 m
et
ho
ds
,
 
fin
d 
sig
n
ifi
ca
nt
 im
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 in
 
re
tu
rn
 
o
n
 
sa
le
s 
an
d 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f r
ea
l e
ar
n
in
gs
, 
re
al
 sa
le
s,
 a
n
d 
em
pl
o
ye
e 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
af
te
r 
pa
rt
ia
l 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n.
 
A
lso
 
fin
d 
th
at
 m
o
re
 r
ec
en
tly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s a
re
 o
f h
ig
he
r 
qu
al
ity
—
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
 
be
tte
r 
af
te
r 
di
v
es
tm
en
t-
-
th
an
 
do
 th
o
se
 d
iv
es
te
d 
ea
rli
er
. 
Pa
ne
l d
at
a 
re
gr
es
sio
n
s 
v
er
ify
 
ba
sic
 fi
n
di
n
gs
 
th
at
 
pr
iv
at
iz
at
io
n
 im
pr
ov
es
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
an
d 
fin
d 
th
at
 
di
ffe
re
n
t o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 st
ru
ct
u
re
s 
ha
v
e 
o
pp
os
ite
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
n
 
fir
m
’
s 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
St
at
e 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
in
gs
 
hi
n
de
r 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, 
w
hi
le
 “
le
ga
l p
er
so
n
”
 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
in
gs
 
pr
om
o
te
 im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
.
 
 
W
ei
, V
ar
el
la
, 
D
’S
ou
za
 a
n
d 
H
as
sa
n
 
(20
03
) 
U
se
 M
N
R
 
m
et
ho
ds
 
to
 
te
st
 
w
he
th
er
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
im
pr
ov
es
 
fo
r 
20
8 
Ch
in
es
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
pa
rti
al
ly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 th
ro
u
gh
 
pu
bl
ic
 
sh
ar
e 
o
ffe
rin
g 
be
tw
ee
n
 
19
90
 
an
d 
19
97
. 
D
oc
u
m
en
t s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t i
m
pr
o
v
em
en
ts
 in
 
re
al
 o
u
tp
u
t, 
as
se
ts
 a
n
d 
sa
le
s, 
sa
le
s 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y,
 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f r
ea
l p
ro
fit
s a
n
d 
le
ve
ra
ge
.
 
Fi
rm
s 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 
m
o
re
 
th
an
 
50
%
 
v
o
tin
g 
co
n
tr
o
l i
s 
co
n
v
ey
ed
 to
 
pr
iv
at
e 
in
v
es
to
rs
 
im
pr
ov
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 m
o
re
 th
an
 
do
 
th
o
se
 th
at
 re
m
ai
n
 
st
at
e 
co
n
tr
o
lle
d.
  
Ti
an
 
(20
02
) 
Ex
am
in
es
 
th
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 a
nd
 c
on
tr
o
l s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 o
f 8
26
 
pa
rt
ia
lly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s l
ist
ed
 
o
n
 
Ch
in
es
e 
st
oc
k 
ex
ch
an
ge
s 
fro
m
 
19
94
-1
99
8 
an
d 
te
st
s 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
be
tw
ee
n
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
an
d 
fir
m
 
v
al
u
e—
as
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
To
bi
n
’
s 
q.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t s
ha
re
ho
ld
in
g 
re
m
ai
n 
v
er
y 
la
rg
e 
in
 
pa
rt
ia
lly
 
pr
iv
at
iz
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s, 
an
d 
th
at
 th
e 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
st
at
e 
ho
ld
in
gs
 
an
d 
fir
m
 
v
al
u
e 
is 
U
-
sh
ap
ed
. G
oi
ng
 
fro
m
 
st
at
e 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
 le
ve
ls 
o
f 0
 to
 3
0%
, i
nc
re
as
in
g 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
ca
u
se
s 
fir
m
 
v
al
u
e 
to
 d
ec
lin
e,
 b
u
t a
fte
r t
ha
t T
o
bi
n’
s 
q 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
ith
 
in
cr
ea
sin
g 
st
at
e 
ow
n
er
sh
ip
. 
Jia
, 
Su
n
 
an
d 
To
n
g 
(20
02
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
lis
tin
g 
o
f 
Ch
in
es
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
in
 
H
on
g 
K
o
n
g 
ca
u
se
s 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
to
 im
pr
ov
e.
 U
se
s 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
of
 
41
 C
hi
ne
se
 H
-s
ha
re
 S
IP
s 
fro
m
 
19
93
-9
8.
 U
se
 M
N
R
 
an
d 
po
ol
ed
 re
gr
es
sio
n
 
pa
ne
l 
da
ta
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
.
 
Fi
nd
 
th
at
 re
al
 n
et
 p
ro
fit
s a
re
 u
n
ch
an
ge
d 
af
te
r p
riv
at
iz
at
io
n
,
 
an
d 
th
at
 re
tu
rn
 
o
n
 
sa
le
s 
de
cl
in
es
 s
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
.
 
O
u
tp
u
t i
nc
re
as
es
 a
n
d 
le
ve
ra
ge
 
de
cl
in
es
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
tly
.
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s 
sh
o
w
 
th
at
 
st
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 is
 
n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
H
-
sh
ar
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
ha
s 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
t, 
po
sit
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
. 
  
